, White v. Regester :: 412 U.S. 755 (1973) :: US LAW US Supreme Court Center

White v. Regester :: 412 U.S. 755 (1973) :: US LAW US Supreme Court Center

    U.S. Supreme Court

    White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973)

    White v. Regester

    No. 72-147

    Argued February 26, 1973

    Decided June 18, 1973

    412 U.S. 755


    In this litigation challenging the Texas 1970 legislative reapportionment scheme, a 3-judge District Court held that the House plan, nation-extensive, contained constitutionally impermissible deviations from population equality, and that the multi-member districts provided for Bexar and Dallas Counties invidiously discriminated towards cognizable racial or ethnic agencies. Though the complete plan turned into declared invalid, the court authorized its use for the 1972 election besides for its injunction order requiring the ones county multi-member districts to be reconstituted into unmarried member districts.


    1. This Court has jurisdiction beneath 28 U.S.C. § 1253 to don't forget the attraction from the injunction order relevant to the Bexar County and Dallas County districting, since the three-choose courtroom have been nicely convened, and this Court can review the declaratory part of the judgment underneath. Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113. Pp. 412 U. S. 759-761.

    2. State reapportionment statutes aren't situation to the stricter requirements relevant to congressional reapportionment beneath Art. I, § 2, and the District Court erred in concluding that this situation, wherein the total maximum version among House districts turned into nine.9%, however the average deviation from an appropriate became 1.eighty two%, concerned invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Cf. Gaffney v. Cummings, ante, p. 412 U. S. 735. Pp. 412 U. S. 761-764.

    three. The District Court s order requiring disestablishment of the multi-member districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties changed into warranted in the mild of the records of political discrimination in opposition to Negroes and Mexican-Americans residing, respectively, in those counties and the residual consequences of such discrimination upon the ones groups. Pp. 412 U. S. 765-770.

    343 F. Supp. 704, affirmed in element, reversed in component, and remanded.

    WHITE, J., brought the opinion of the Court, in Parts I, III, and IV of which all has memberships joined, and in Part II of which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST,

    Page 412 U. S. 756

    JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in component and dissenting in component, wherein DOUGLAS and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 412 U. S. 772.

    U.S. Supreme Court

    White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973)

    White v. Regester

    No. 72-147

    Argued February 26, 1973

    Decided June 18, 1973

    412 U.S. 755




    In this litigation hard the Texas 1970 legislative reapportionment scheme, a three-decide District Court held that the House plan, state-huge, contained constitutionally impermissible deviations from population equality, and that the multi-member districts furnished for Bexar and Dallas Counties invidiously discriminated in opposition to cognizable racial or ethnic corporations. Though the complete plan turned into declared invalid, the court approved its use for the 1972 election except for its injunction order requiring those two county multi-member districts to be reconstituted into unmarried member districts.


    1. This Court has jurisdiction underneath 28 U.S.C. § 1253 to take into account the enchantment from the injunction order relevant to the Bexar County and Dallas County districting, for the reason that three-decide court were well convened, and this Court can evaluate the declaratory a part of the judgment beneath. Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113. Pp. 412 U. S. 759-761.

    2. State reapportionment statutes aren't challenge to the stricter standards relevant to congressional reapportionment underneath Art. I, § 2, and the District Court erred in concluding that this example, where the overall most variation between House districts turned into 9.nine%, however the average deviation from the perfect was 1.eighty two%, concerned invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Cf. Gaffney v. Cummings, ante, p. 412 U. S. 735. Pp. 412 U. S. 761-764.

    three. The District Court s order requiring disestablishment of the multi-member districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties become warranted in the mild of the records of political discrimination in opposition to Negroes and Mexican-Americans living, respectively, in those counties and the residual effects of such discrimination upon the ones groups. Pp. 412 U. S. 765-770.

    343 F. Supp. 704, affirmed in element, reversed in element, and remanded.

    WHITE, J., brought the opinion of the Court, in Parts I, III, and IV of which all has memberships joined, and in Part II of which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST,

    Page 412 U. S. 756

    JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in element and dissenting in part, wherein DOUGLAS and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 412 U. S. 772.

    MR. JUSTICE WHITE introduced the opinion of the Court.

    This case raises questions regarding the validity of the reapportionment plan for the Texas House of Representatives followed in 1970 via the State Legislative Redistricting Board: First, whether there were unconstitutionally big versions in population a few of the districts defined by way of the plan; 2d, whether the multi-member districts provided for Bexar and Dallas Counties had been well found to had been invidiously discriminatory in opposition to cognizable racial or ethnic businesses in those counties.

    Page 412 U. S. 757

    The Texas Constitution calls for the kingdom legislature to reapportion the House and Senate at its first ordinary consultation following the decennial census. Tex.Const., Art. III, § 28. [Footnote 1] In 1970, the legislature proceeded to reapportion the House of Representatives, however didn't agree on a redistricting plan for the Senate. Litigation

    Page 412 U. S. 758

    was without delay commenced in nation court tough the constitutionality of the House reapportionment. The Texas Supreme Court held that the legislature s plan for the House violated the Texas Constitution. [Footnote 2] Smith v. Craddick, 471 S.W.2nd 375 (1971). Meanwhile, pursuant to the requirements of the Texas Constitution, a Legislative Redistricting Board had been formed to begin the task of redistricting the Texas Senate. Although the Board to begin with restricted its paintings to the reapportionment of the Senate, it became ultimately ordered, in mild of the judicial invalidation of the House plan, to additionally reapportion the House. Mauzy v. Legislative Redistricting Board, 471 S.W.2d 570 (1971).

    On October 15, 1971, the Redistricting Board s plan for the reapportionment of the Senate turned into launched, and, on October 22, 1971, the House plan was promulgated. Only the House plan stays at difficulty in this example. That plan divided the 150-member body among 79 single-member and 11 multi-member districts. Four court cases, in the end consolidated, have been filed challenging the

    Page 412 U. S. 759

    Board s Senate and House plans and asserting with admire to the House plan that it contained impermissible deviations from population equality and that its multi-member districts for Bexar County and Dallas County operated to dilute the voting energy of racial and ethnic minorities.

    A three-decide District Court sustained the Senate plan, however observed the House plan unconstitutional. Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704 (WD Tex.1972). The House plan was held to incorporate constitutionally impermissible deviations from population equality, and the multi-member districts in Bexar and Dallas Counties have been deemed constitutionally invalid. The District Court gave the Texas Legislature until July l, 1973, to reapportion the House, but the District Court authorised the Board s plan to be used for functions of the 1972 election, except for requiring that the Dallas County and Bexar County multi-member districts be reconstituted into single member districts for the 1972 election.

    Appellants appealed the state-huge invalidation of the House plan and the substitution of unmarried member for multi-member districts in Dallas County and Bexar County. [Footnote three] MR. JUSTICE POWELL denied a stay of the judgment of the District Court, 406 U.S. 1201, and we cited probable jurisdiction sub nom. Bullock v. Regester, 409 U.S. 840.


    We deal on the outset with the project to our jurisdiction over this enchantment beneath 28 U.S.C. § 1253, which permits injunctions in fits required to be heard and determined by means of a 3-decide district court to be appealed

    Page 412 U. S. 760

    immediately to this Court. [Footnote four] It is first advised that the case become no longer one required to be heard with the aid of a 3-decide court. The rivalry is frivolous. A state-extensive reapportionment statute turned into challenged and injunctions were asked towards its enforcement. The constitutional questions raised were no longer insubstantial on their face, and the complaint simply known as for the convening of a 3-decide court docket. That the courtroom declared the entire apportionment plan invalid, but entered an injunction only with respect to its implementation for the 1972 elections in Dallas and Bexar Counties, in no manner indicates that the case required simplest a single decide. Appellants are consequently properly right here on direct appeal with recognize to the injunction handling Bexar and Dallas Counties, for the order of the court directed at the ones counties turned into actually an order "granting . . . an . . . injunction in any civil movement . . . required . . . to be heard and decided through a district court docket of 3 judges" inside the which means of § 1253.

    We also keep that appellants, due to the fact they appealed from the access of an injunction, are entitled to study of the District Court s accompanying announcement that the proposed plan for the Texas House of Representatives, which include those quantities providing for multi-member districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties, became invalid country-extensive. This assertion become the predicate for the courtroom s order requiring Dallas and Bexar Counties to be reapportioned into unmarried districts; for its order that,

    "unless the Legislature of the State of Texas on or before July 1, 1973, has adopted a plan to reapportion the legislative districts

    Page 412 U. S. 761

    within the State according with the constitutional pointers set out in this opinion this Court will so reapportion the State of Texas;"

    and for its order that the Secretary of State "undertake and put into effect any and all methods necessary to properly effectuate the orders of this Court in conformance with this Opinion. . . ." 343 F. Supp. at 737. In those occasions, although appellants could not have without delay appealed to this Court the entry of a declaratory judgment unaccompanied via any injunctive relief, Gunn v. University Committee, 399 U. S. 383 (1970); Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U. S. 427 (1970), we conclude that we've got jurisdiction of the whole appeal. Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S. seventy three (1960). With the Texas reapportionment plan before it, it become inside the hobby of judicial economy and the avoidance of piecemeal litigation that the three-judge District Court have jurisdiction over all claims raised in opposition to the statute while a considerable constitutional claim turned into alleged, and an enchantment to us, as soon as nicely right here, has the same attain. Roe v. Wade, supra, at 410 U. S. 123; Carter v. Jury Comm n, 396 U. S. 320 (1970); Florida Lime Avocado Growers v. Jacobsen, supra, at 362 U. S. eighty.


    The reapportionment plan for the Texas House of Representatives presents for a hundred and fifty representatives to be selected from 79 unmarried member and 11 multi-member districts. The ideal district is 74,645 persons. The districts range from seventy one,597 to seventy eight,943 in population according to consultant, or from five.8% overrepresentation to 4.1% underrepresentation. The total variation between the most important and smallest district is thus 9.9%. [Footnote five]

    The District Court examine our previous instances to require any deviations from same populace amongst districts to be

    Page 412 U. S. 762

    justified through "appropriate motives" grounded in country coverage; depended on Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526 (1969), to conclude that the permissible tolerances cautioned by Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964), were extensively eroded; advised that Abate v. Mundt, 403 U. S. 182 (1971), in accepting general deviations of 11.9% in a county reapportionment become sui generis; and considered the "crucial trouble" before it to be whether "the State [has] justified any and all variances, but small, on the basis of a regular, rational State policy." 343 F. Supp. at 713. Noting the unmarried truth that the full deviation from an appropriate among District three and District eighty five was nine.9%, the District Court concluded that justification via appellants was known as for, and will find out no applicable country policy to aid the deviations. The District Court became additionally critical of the movements and procedures of the Legislative Reapportionment Board, and doubted "that [the] board did the sort of deliberative process . . . worth of judicial abstinence." Id. at 717. It also taken into consideration the combination of single-member and multi-member districts inside the House plan "haphazard," specially in providing single member districts in Houston and multi-member districts in other metropolitan regions, and that this "irrationality, without reasoned justification, may be a separate and distinct ground for asserting the plan unconstitutional." [Footnote 6] Ibid.

    Page 412 U. S. 763

    Finally, the court specifically invalidated the usage of multi-member districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties as unconstitutionally discriminatory against a racial or ethnic institution.

    The District Court s closing conclusion changed into that

    "the apportionment plan for the State of Texas is unconstitutional as unjustifiably far off from the proper of one man, one vote, and that the multi-member districting schemes for the House of Representatives as they relate in particular to Dallas and to Bexar Counties are unconstitutional in that they dilute the votes of racial minorities."

    Id. at 735. [Footnote 7]

    Insofar as the District Court s judgment rested on the conclusion that the population differential of 9.9% from an appropriate district among District 3 and District 85 made out a prima facie identical protection violation beneath the Fourteenth Amendment, absent special justification, the court docket was in mistakes. It is plain from Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. 315 (1973), and Gaffney v. Cummings, ante, p. 412 U. S. 735, that nation reapportionment statutes are not subject to the identical strict requirements relevant to reapportionment of congressional seats. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler did no longer dilute the tolerances pondered by way of Reynolds v. Sims with respect to kingdom districting, and we did not maintain in Swann v. Adams, 385 U. S. 440 (1967), or Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U. S. one hundred twenty (1967), or

    Page 412 U. S. 764

    later in Mahan v. Howell, supra, that any deviations from absolute equality, however small, need to be justified to the pride of the judiciary to keep away from invalidation underneath the Equal Protection Clause. For the reasons set out in Gaffney v. Cummings, supra, we do now not remember quite minor populace deviations among state legislative districts to extensively dilute the load of individual votes within the large districts so that it will deprive people in those districts of fair and powerful representation. Those reasons are as relevant to Texas as they're to Connecticut, and we cannot glean an identical protection violation from the unmarried fact that legislative districts in Texas range from each other via as plenty as 9.nine% when in comparison to an appropriate district. Very probably, larger differences between districts would no longer be tolerable without justification "based totally on legitimate concerns incident to the effectuation of a rational nation coverage," Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 377 U.S. 579; Mahan v. Howell, supra, at 410 U. S. 325, however right here we're assured that appellees didn't convey their burden of evidence insofar as they sought to establish a contravention of the Equal Protection Clause from population variations on my own. The general variant among two districts become nine.nine%, but the common deviation of all House districts from the perfect turned into 1.82%. Only 23 districts, all single member, were overrepresented or underrepresented with the aid of greater than three%, and best three of those districts via greater than 5%. We are unable to conclude from these deviations alone that appellees glad the edge requirement of proving a prima facie case of invidious discrimination below the Equal Protection Clause. Because the District Court had a opposite view, its judgment should be reversed in this respect. [Footnote 8]

    Page 412 U. S. 765


    We verify the District Court s judgment, however, insofar because it invalidated the multi-member districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties, and ordered those districts to be redrawn into single member districts. Plainly, under our cases, multi-member districts aren't in line with se unconstitutional, nor are they necessarily unconstitutional while used in mixture with unmarried member districts in other components of the State. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971); Mahan v. Howell, supra; see Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. seventy three (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433 (1965); Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U. S. 713 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, supra. [Footnote 9] But we've entertained claims that multi-member districts are being used invidiously to cancel out or limit the voting electricity of racial agencies. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra; Burns v. Richardson, supra; Fortson v. Dorsey, supra. To sustain such claims, it isn't always sufficient that the racial organization allegedly

    Page 412 U. S. 766

    discriminated towards has no longer had legislative seats in percentage to its vote casting capacity. The plaintiffs burden is to provide evidence to support findings that the political techniques main to nomination and election had been now not similarly open to participation by way of the group in question -- that its contributors had less opportunity than did different citizens in the district to participate within the political approaches and to pick legislators of their preference. Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 403 U. S. 149-one hundred fifty.

    With due regard for those standards, the District Court first stated the records of reliable racial discrimination in Texas, which at instances touched the proper of Negroes to check in and vote and to participate inside the democratic techniques. 343 F. Supp. at 725. It referred also to the Texas rule requiring a majority vote as a prerequisite to nomination in a number one election and to the so-known as "location" rule limiting candidacy for legislative workplace from a multi-member district to a distinct "area" at the ticket, with the result being the election of representatives from the Dallas multi-member district decreased to a head-to-head contest for every role. These characteristics of the Texas electoral machine, neither in themselves mistaken nor invidious, superior the opportunity for racial discrimination, the District Court concept. [Footnote 10] More fundamentally, it located that, on account that Reconstruction days, there had been simplest two Negroes in the Dallas County delegation to the Texas House of Representatives, and that these had been the only Negroes ever slated by way of the Dallas Committee for Responsible Government (DCRG), a white-ruled business enterprise that is in effective manipulate of Democratic Party

    Page 412 U. S. 767

    candidate slating in Dallas County. [Footnote eleven] That corporation, the District Court located, did now not want the assist of the Negro community to win elections inside the county, and it did not therefore show off top faith challenge for the political and other desires and aspirations of the Negro network. The court docket found that, as recently as 1970, the DCRG become depending upon "racial campaign processes in white precincts to defeat applicants who had the overpowering guide of the black network." Id. at 727. Based at the proof earlier than it, the District Court concluded that "the black community has been efficiently excluded from participation within the Democratic primary selection procedure," identity. at 726, and turned into therefore usually no longer authorized to enter into the political system in a reliable and significant manner. These findings and conclusions are enough to preserve the District Court s judgment with admire to the Dallas multi-member district, and, on this file, we don't have any motive to disturb them.


    The equal is authentic of the order requiring disestablishment of the multi-member district in Bexar County. Consistently with Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475 (1954), the District Court considered the Mexican-Americans in Bexar County to be an identifiable magnificence for Fourteenth Amendment purposes, and proceeded to inquire whether the impact of the multi-member district in this institution constituted invidious discrimination. Surveying the historic and present circumstance of the Bexar County Mexican-American community, that is concentrated

    Page 412 U. S. 768

    for the most component on the west side of the metropolis of San Antonio, the court docket observed, based upon prior cases and the report before it, that the Bexar community, at the side of other Mexican-Americans in Texas, [Footnote 12] had lengthy

    "suffered from, and keeps to be afflicted by, the outcomes and outcomes of invidious discrimination and remedy within the fields of education, employment, economics, health, politics and others."

    343 F. Supp. at 728. The bulk of the Mexican-American network in Bexar County occupied the Barrio, a place inclusive of about 28 contiguous census tracts inside the metropolis of San Antonio. Over seventy eight% of Barrio residents were Mexican-Americans, making up 29% of the county s overall population. The Barrio is an area of terrible housing; its residents have low profits and a excessive fee of unemployment. The traditional Mexican-American suffers a cultural and language barrier [Footnote 13] that makes his participation in community processes extraordinarily difficult, especially, the court concept, with recognize to the political existence of Bexar County.

    "[A] cultural incompatibility . . . conjoined with the ballot tax and the maximum restrictive voter registration strategies within the state, have operated to efficiently deny Mexican-Americans access to the political techniques in Texas even longer than the Blacks had been formally denied get admission to by means of the white primary."

    343 F. Supp. at 731. The residual impact of this records reflected itself in the reality that Mexican-American vote casting registration remained very bad within the county, and that only five Mexican-Americans considering 1880 have served in the Texas Legislature from

    Page 412 U. S. 769

    Bexar County. Of these, best have been from the Barrio vicinity. [Footnote 14] The District Court additionally concluded from the evidence that the Bexar County legislative delegation in the House turned into insufficiently aware of Mexican-American pursuits.

    Based at the totality of the circumstances, the District Court evolved its ultimate evaluation of the multi-member district, overlaid, because it was, on the cultural and monetary realities of the Mexican-American community in Bexar County and its relationship with the rest of the county. Its judgment changed into that Bexar County Mexican-Americans

    "are successfully eliminated from the political techniques of Bexar [County] in violation of all of the Whitcomb standards, anything their absolute numbers may also general in that County."

    Id. at 733. Single-member districts were idea required to treatment "the consequences of beyond and gift discrimination in opposition to Mexican-Americans," ibid., and to bring the network into the total circulate of political existence of the county and State with the aid of encouraging their similarly registration, voting, and different political sports.

    The District Court apparently paid due heed to Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, did not hold that every racial or political group has a constitutional right to be represented inside the state legislature, but did, from its very own special vantage point, conclude that the multi-member district, as designed and operated in Bexar County, invidiously excluded Mexican-Americans from powerful participation in political life, mainly within the election of representatives to the Texas House of Representatives. On the record before us, we are not inclined to overturn these findings, representing as they do a blend of history and an intensely local appraisal of the layout and effect of

    Page 412 U. S. 770

    the Bexar County multi-member district inside the light of past and present truth, political and in any other case.

    Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

    the following districts:



    Average Deviation

    Multi- (Under) Over

    District Population member Over (Under)

    1 seventy six,285 1,640 2.2

    2 77,102 2,457 3.three

    three 78,943 four,298 five.eight

    four seventy one,928 (2,717) (3.6)

    5 seventy five,014 369 .5

    6 76,051 1,406 1.nine

    7 (three) 221,314 73,771 ( 874) (1.2)

    eight 74,303 ( 342) ( .5)

    9 seventy six,813 2,168 2.9

    10 72,410 (2,235) (3.zero)

    eleven seventy three,136 (1,509) (2.zero)

    12 seventy four,704 59 .1

    thirteen seventy five,929 1,284 1.7

    14 76,597 1,952 2.6

    15 seventy six,701 2,056 2.8

    sixteen 74,218 ( 427) ( .6)

    17 72,941 (1,704) (2.three)

    18 77,159 2,514 three.4

    19 (2) 150,209 seventy five,104 459 .6

    20 75,592 947 1.3

    21 seventy four,651 6 .zero

    22 73,311 (1,334) (1.8)

    23 seventy five,777 1,132 1.5

    24 73,966 ( 679) ( .nine)

    25 seventy five,633 988 1.three

    26 (18) 1,327,321 73,740 ( 905) (1.2)

    27 77,788 three,143 4.2

    28 72,367 (2,278) (three.1)

    29 seventy six,505 1,860 2.five

    30 77,008 2,363 3.2

    31 seventy five,half 380 .five

    32 (9) 675,499 seventy five,0.5 410 .5

    33 73,071 (1,574) (2.1)

    34 76,071 1,426 1.nine

    35 (2) 147,553 73,777 ( 868) (1.2)

    36 seventy four,633 ( 12) ( .0)

    37 (four) 295,516 seventy three,879 ( 766) (1.0)

    Page 412 U. S. 771

    38 78,897 four,252 five.7

    39 77,363 2,718 3.6

    forty seventy one,597 (three,048) (4.1)

    41 73,678 ( 967) (1.3)

    42 seventy four,706 sixty one .1

    43 seventy four,one hundred sixty ( 485) ( .6)

    44 seventy five,278 633 .eight

    forty five seventy eight,090 3,445 4.6

    46 (11) 826,698 75,154 509 .7

    forty seven 76,319 1,674 2.2

    48 (three) 220,056 seventy three,352 (1,293) (1.7)

    forty nine 76,254 1,609 2.2

    50 seventy four,268 ( 377) ( .5)

    51 seventy five,800 1,a hundred and fifty five 1.5

    fifty two seventy six,601 1,956 2.6

    53 seventy four,499 ( 146) ( .2)

    fifty four 77,505 2,860 3.8

    55 seventy six,947 2,302 three.1

    fifty six 74,070 ( 575) ( .8)

    57 seventy seven,211 2,566 three.4

    fifty eight 75,one hundred twenty 475 .6

    59 (2) one hundred forty four,995 seventy two,497 (2,148) (2.nine)

    60 seventy five,054 409 .5

    sixty one 73,356 (1,289) (1.7)

    sixty two 72,240 (2,405) (3.2)

    sixty three 75,191 546 .7

    64 74,546 ( 99) ( .1)

    65 75,720 1,1/2 1.four

    sixty six seventy two,310 (2,335) (3.1)

    67 seventy five,034 389 .5

    68 74,524 ( 121) ( .2)

    sixty nine 74,765 a hundred and twenty .2

    70 seventy seven,827 3,182 4.three

    71 seventy three,711 ( 934) (1.3)

    72 (4) 297,770 74,442 ( 203) ( .three)

    seventy three 74,309 ( 336) ( .five)

    74 seventy three,743 ( 902) (1.2)

    seventy five (2) 147,722 seventy three,861 ( 784) (1.1)

    seventy six 76,083 1,438 1.nine

    seventy seven seventy seven,704 three,059 four.1

    seventy eight 71,900 (2,745) (3.7)

    seventy nine seventy five,164 519 .7

    eighty seventy five,111 466 .6

    eighty one 75,674 1,029 1.4

    eighty two seventy six,006 1,361 1.eight

    Page 412 U. S. 772

    eighty three 75,752 1,107 1.5

    84 seventy five,634 989 1.3

    eighty five 71,564 (three,081) (4.1)

    86 seventy three,157 (1,488) (2.0)

    87 73,half (1,six hundred) (2.1)

    88 seventy five,076 431 .6

    89 74,206 ( 439) ( .6)

    90 seventy four,377 ( 268) ( .4)

    91 73,381 (1,264) (1.7)

    ninety two seventy one,908 (2,737) (3.7)

    ninety three seventy two,761 (1,884) (2.five)

    94 seventy three,328 (1,317) (1.eight)

    95 seventy three,825 ( 820) (1.1)

    96 72,505 (2,one hundred forty) (2.nine)

    97 74,202 ( 443) ( .6)

    ninety eight seventy two,380 (2,265) (three.0)

    99 74,123 ( 522) ( .7)

    a hundred seventy five,682 1,037 1.4

    a hundred and one 75,204 559 .7


    [Footnote 1]

    Article III, § 28, of the Texas Constitution affords:

    "The Legislature shall, at its first everyday session after the publication of every United States decennial census, apportion the state into senatorial and consultant districts, agreeable to the provisions of Sections 25, 26, and 26-a of this Article. In the occasion the Legislature shall at such a first ordinary consultation following the e-book of a United States decennial census, fail to make such apportionment, equal will be finished by way of the Legislature Redistricting Board of Texas, that is hereby created, and will be composed of 5 (five) contributors, as follows: The Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Lawyer General, the Comptroller of Public Accounts and the Commissioner of the General Land Office, a majority of whom shall represent a quorum. Said Board shall collect within the City of Austin within 90 (ninety) days after the final adjournment of such regular consultation. The Board shall, inside sixty (60) days after assembling, apportion the kingdom into senatorial and consultant districts, or into senatorial or representative districts, as the failure of action of such Legislature may additionally make necessary. Such apportionment will be in writing and signed through three (three) or more of the individuals of the Board duly acknowledged as the act and deed of such Board, and, when so completed and filed with the Secretary of State, shall have pressure and effect of regulation. Such apportionment shall emerge as effective at the following succeeding nation-extensive trendy election. The Supreme Court of Texas shall have jurisdiction to compel such Commission [Board] to perform its obligations in accordance with the provisions of this section through writ of mandamus or different high-quality writs conformable to the usages of law. The Legislature shall offer vital funds for clerical and technical resource and for other costs incidental to the paintings of the Board, and the Lieutenant Governor and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be entitled to get hold of in line with diem and journey cost all through the Board s consultation within the same manner and amount as they might acquire even as attending a unique session of the Legislature. This modification shall turn out to be powerful January 1 1951. As amended Nov. 2.1948."

    [Footnote 2]

    The Court held that the plan violated Art. III, § 26, of the Texas Constitution, which provides:

    "The individuals of the House of Representatives shall be apportioned a few of the numerous counties, in keeping with the range of populace in every, as nearly as may be, on a ratio acquired by way of dividing the population of the State, as ascertained by means of the maximum latest United States census, by the range of individuals of which the House consists; supplied, that, each time a single county has sufficient populace to be entitled to a Representative, such county shall be fashioned into a separate Representative District, and when two or greater counties are required to make up the ratio of representation, such counties shall be contiguous to every other; and whilst someone county has greater than enough populace to be entitled to at least one or more Representatives, such Representative or Representatives will be apportioned to such county, and for any surplus of populace it may be joined in a Representative District with any other contiguous county or counties."

    [Footnote three]

    In a separate appeal, we summarily affirmed that part of the judgment of the District Court upholding the Senate plan. Archer v. Smith, 409 U.S. 808 (1972).

    [Footnote 4]

    Title 28 U.S.C. § 1253 presents:

    "Except as in any other case supplied by way of law, any birthday celebration may attraction to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after observe and hearing, an interlocutory or everlasting injunction in any civil action, fit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and decided through a district courtroom of 3 judges."

    [Footnote 5>Appendix to opinion of the Court, submit, p. 412 U. S. 770.

    [Footnote 6]

    It may be, although we aren't certain, that the District Court would have invalidated the plan state-wide due to what it notion was an irrational combination of multi-member and single member districts. Thus, in wondering using unmarried member districts in Houston but multi-member districts in all different urban regions, and remarking that the State had supplied neither "compelling" nor "rational" reason for the differing remedy, the District Court merely concluded that this category "may be" an impartial ground for invalidating the plan. But there aren't any authorities on this Court for the proposition that the mere combination of multi-member and unmarried-member districts in a single plan, even amongst urban areas, is invidiously discriminatory, and we construe the comments no longer as part of the District Court s declaratory judgment invalidating the country plan, but as mere increase advice to the Texas Legislature as to what would or could no longer be perfect to the District Court.

    [Footnote 7]

    The District Court also concluded, opposite to the assertions of sure plaintiffs, that the Senate districting scheme for Bexar County did not "unconstitutionally dilute the votes of any political faction or party." 343 F. Supp. 704, 735. The majority of the District Court additionally concluded that the Senate districting scheme for Harris County did not dilute black votes.

    [Footnote 8]

    The court s end that the versions in this situation have been now not justified by using a rational nation coverage could, in any event, require reconsideration and reversal under Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. 315 (1973). The Texas Constitution, Art. III, § 26, expresses the state coverage in opposition to cutting county lines wherever feasible in forming representative districts. The District Court recognized the policy however, with out the gain of Mahan v. Howell, may additionally have concept the variations too superb to be justified via that policy. It possibly notion additionally that the coverage had no longer been sufficiently or continually observed right here. But it seems to us that to stay within tolerable population limits it become necessary to cut some county strains and that the State carried out a constitutionally perfect lodging between populace standards and its coverage against slicing county lines in forming consultant districts.

    [Footnote 9]

    See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 403 U. S. 141-148 (1971), and the cases mentioned in n. 22 of that opinion, which include Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U. S. 120 (1967), in which we affirmed the District Court s rejection of petitioners rivalry that the combination of unmarried-member, multi-member, and floterial districts in a unmarried reapportionment plan become "an unconstitutional crazy quilt. " Id. at 386 U. S. 121.

    [Footnote 10]

    There is not any requirement that candidates live in subdistricts of the multi-member district. Thus, all applicants may be selected from out of doors the Negro residential area.

    [Footnote eleven]

    The District Court discovered that

    "it's far extremely hard to stable either a representative seat in the Dallas County delegation or the Democratic number one nomination without the endorsement of the Dallas Committee for Responsible Government."

    343 F. Supp. at 726.

    [Footnote 12]

    Mexican-Americans constituted about 20% of the population of the State of Texas.

    [Footnote 13]

    The District Court discovered that

    "[t]he reality that [Mexican-Americans] are reared in a tradition wherein a dialect of Spanish is the primary language affords everlasting impediments to their educational and vocational advancement, and creates other traumatic troubles."

    343 F. Supp. at 730.

    [Footnote 14]

    Two other residents of the Barrio, a Negro and an Anglo-American, have also served inside the Texas Legislature.

    MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL be a part of, dissenting in No. 71-1476, ante p. 412 U. S. 735, and concurring in component and dissenting in element in No. 72-147.

    The Court nowadays upholds nation-wide legislative apportionment plans for Connecticut and Texas, even though these plans admittedly entail enormous inequalities inside the populace of the representative districts, and despite the fact that the States have made honestly no try to justify their failure "to construct districts . . . as nearly of equal populace as is doable." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 377 U.S. 577 (1964). In reaching this conclusion, the Court units aside the judgment of the US District Court for the District of Connecticut protecting the Connecticut plan invalid, and the judgment of the USA District Court for the Western District

    Page 412 U. S. 773

    of Texas achieving a comparable end result as to the Texas plan. In the Texas case, the Court does verify, however, the District Court s determination that the use of multi-member districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties had the unconstitutional effect of minimizing the voting power of racial groups. [Footnote 2/1] See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 403 U. S. 142-a hundred and forty four (1971); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. seventy three, 384 U. S. 88 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 379 U. S. 439 (1965). With that latter end I am in full settlement, as I also agree with and join Part I of the Court s opinion in No. seventy two-147, White v. Regester. But the decision to uphold the kingdom apportionment schemes reflects a tremendous and really unfortunate retreat from the concepts set up in our in advance instances, and I therefore must kingdom my dissenting views.


    At difficulty in No. 71-1476, Gaffney v. Cummings, is the 1971 reapportionment plan for election of participants of the House of Representatives of Connecticut. The plan become premised on a 151-member House, with each member elected from a unmarried member district. Since the population of the State became three,032.217, according to 1970 census information, the appropriate could restoration the population of each district at 20,081. In truth, the populace of many

    Page 412 U. S. 774

    districts deviated appreciably from the precise, starting from a district underrepresented by 3.ninety three% to one overrepresented by three.9%. The overall unfold of deviation -- a determine deemed applicable in every of our in advance selections -- changed into 7.eighty three %. The populace of 39 meeting districts deviated from the average by using more than 3%. Another 34 districts deviated with the aid of extra than 2%. The average deviation was simply below 2%. To display that the country plan did now not reap the finest attainable degree of equality in in step with-district population, appellees submitted some of proposed apportionment plans, which include one that would have notably decreased the volume of inequality. The overall range of deviation below appellees plan could were 2.sixty one%, compared to 7.eighty three% beneath the kingdom plan.

    The District Court held the kingdom plan invalid at the floor that "the deviations from equality of populations of the . . . House districts are not justified by means of any enough nation interest." [Footnote 2/2] 341 F. Supp. 139, 148 (Conn.1972). Instead of adopting considered one of appellees plans, the court docket appointed a Special Master to chart a brand new plan, and his effort produced a scheme with a total range of deviation of most effective 1.16%. In overturning the District Court s choice, the Court does not finish, as it did earlier this Term in Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. 315 (1973), that the District Court didn't figure the State s sufficient justification for the deviations. Indeed, in view of appellant s 1/2-hearted attempts to justify

    Page 412 U. S. 775

    the deviations at problem here, the sort of conclusion ought to infrequently be supported. Whereas the Commonwealth of Virginia made a extensive effort to attract district traces in conformity with the bounds of political subdivisions -- an effort that changed into located enough in Mahan v. Howell to validate a plan with total deviation of sixteen.4% -- the evidence within the case earlier than us requires the conclusion that Connecticut s apportionment plan changed into drawn in whole disregard of political subdivision lines. The District Court pointed out that

    "[t]he boundary traces of 47 cities are cut below the Plan in order that one or more quantities of each of these 47 towns are added to every other town or a part of any other town to shape an meeting district."

    341 F. Supp. at 142. Moreover, the boundary traces of 29 of these 47 towns were cut greater than once, and the plan created "78 segments of towns in the formation of 151 assembly districts." Ibid.

    Although appellant failed to offer cogent reasons in clarification of the full-size variations in district population, the Court despite the fact that upholds the kingdom plan. The Court motives that even inside the absence of any reason for the failure to achieve equality, the showing of a total deviation of almost 8% does no longer make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination below the Fourteenth Amendment. Deviations no extra than 8% are, in other phrases, to be deemed de minimis, and the State want not offer any justification in any respect for the failure to approximate greater carefully the proper of Reynolds v. Sims, supra.

    The Texas reapportionment case, No. 72-147, White v. Regester, affords a comparable state of affairs, besides that the range of deviation in district population is greater and the State s justifications are, if some thing, extra meager. An perfect district in Texas, which chooses the a hundred and fifty individuals of the State House of Representatives from seventy nine single-member and eleven multi-member districts, is seventy four,645. As

    Page 412 U. S. 776

    described within the State s 1970 plan, a large number of districts departed extensively from the precise. The general variety of deviation changed into at the least 9.9%, and arguably almost 30%, depending on the mode of calculation. [Footnote 2/3] The District Court mentioned that

    "[i]n all the proof provided in this example, the State has no longer tried to explain in phrases of rational State coverage its failure to create districts same in population as nearly as possible, nor has the State sought to justify a single deviation from particular mathematical equality. The lengthy depositions of the individuals of the legislative redistricting board and of the staff individuals who did the real drawing of the legislative district traces are devoid of any significant symptoms of the requirements used."

    343 F. Supp. 704, 714 (WD Tex.1972). As the District Court s opinion makes clear, the versions clearly can't be defended as a necessary byproduct of a country attempt to keep away from fragmentation of political subdivisions. Nevertheless, the Court these days units apart the District Court s decision, reasoning, as in the Connecticut case, that a displaying of as an awful lot as 9.nine% general deviation nonetheless does no longer establish a prima facie case underneath the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the Court expresses no misgivings approximately our latest selection in Abate v. Mundt, 403 U. S. 182 (1971), wherein we held that a complete deviation of 11.nine% have to be

    Page 412 U. S. 777

    justified by the State, you will reasonably surmise that a line has been drawn at 10% -- deviations in excess of that amount are seemingly suited best on a displaying of justification via the State; deviations much less than that amount require no justification whatsoever.


    The proposition that positive deviations from equality of district populace are so small as to lack constitutional importance, whilst again and again urged in this Court by using States that failed to achieve specific equality, has in no way before commanded a majority of the Court. [Footnote 2/4] Indeed, in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526, 394 U. S. 530 (169), we expressly rejected the argument

    "that there's a hard and fast numerical or percentage population variance small enough to be taken into consideration de minimis and to satisfy without query the as nearly as conceivable trendy. The entire thrust of the as nearly as plausible approach is inconsistent with adoption of fixed numerical standards which excuse populace variances without regard to the instances of each specific case."

    The Court motives, but, that Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,

    Page 412 U. S. 778

    supra, a case that involved the department of Missouri into congressional districts, has no software to the apportionment of seats in a nation legislature. In my dissenting opinion in Mahan v. Howell, supra, I talked about that the language, reasoning, and heritage of the Kirkpatrick selection all command the realization that our conserving there is applicable to kingdom legislative apportionment no much less than to congressional districting. In fact, this Court particularly recognized as lots in the context of a project to an Arizona apportionment scheme in Ely v. Klahr, 403 U. S. 108 (1971). Describing the opinion of the District Court whose judgment was below review, we stated that the courtroom beneath had

    "properly concluded that this plan changed into invalid beneath Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526 (1969), and Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U. S. 542 (1969), because the legislature had operated at the belief that a sixteen% deviation become de minimis, and consequently made no effort to gain greater equality."

    403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 111. Yet it's miles precisely the sort of notion that the Court these days approves. [Footnote 2/5]

    Moreover, even if Kirkpatrick must be deemed inapplicable to the apportionment of nation legislative districts, the reasoning that gave rise to our rejection of a

    Page 412 U. S. 779

    de minimis method is fully applicable to the case earlier than us. We talked about there that the "as nearly as doable" trendy -- the same old that controls legislative apportionment as well as congressional districting, Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 377 U.S. 577 -- demands that

    "the State make a good faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality. . . . Equal illustration for identical numbers of humans is a precept designed to save you debasement of vote casting power and diminution of get entry to to elected representatives. Toleration of even small deviations detracts from those functions."

    394 U.S. at 394 U. S. 530-531. Kirkpatrick identified that

    "to recall a positive range of variances de minimis could inspire legislators to strive for that variety instead of for equality as nearly as doable."

    394 U.S. at 394 U. S. 531.

    Although not purporting to quarrel with the principle that particular mathematical equality is the constitutionally mandated purpose of reapportionment, the Court today establishes a extensive margin of tolerable errors, and thereby undermines the effort to effectuate the precept. For it is clear that the state legislatures and the kingdom and federal courts have regarded Kirkpatrick as controlling on the difficulty of legislative apportionment, and the outgrowth of that assumption has been a simply extremely good document of compliance with the constitutional mandate. Appellees in No. 71-1476 make the point forcefully by using evaluating the quantity of inequality inside the population of legislative districts previous to 1969, the 12 months of our choice in Kirkpatrick, with the volume of inequality in subsequent years. [Footnote 2/6] Prior to 1969, the variety of variances in population of nation senatorial districts surpassed 15% in 44 of the 50 States. Three States had

    Page 412 U. S. 780

    decreased the full variance to between 1070 and 15%; had reduce the variance to between five% and 10%; handiest one had decreased the variance below 5%. The report of apportionment of kingdom House districts become even much less encouraging. Variances in excess of 15% characterised all but of the States, and simplest the sort of had brought the whole variance underneath 10%. The improvement within the publish-1969 years could not had been extra dramatic. The table supplied via appellees, set out in full in the margin, [Footnote 2/7] exhibits that, in nearly one-1/2 of the States, the whole variance in populace of senatorial districts turned into within 5% to 0. Of the forty five States as to which statistics become to be had, 32 had decreased the overall variance below 10% and most effective 8 had didn't bring the entire variance underneath 15%. With regard to House districts, the development is comparable. On the idea of data regarding 42 States, it appears that 20 had finished a total variance of much less than 5%, and most effective 14 retained districts with a complete variance of greater than 15% from the constitutional best.

    To respect the significance of this encouraging development, it's miles essential to apprehend that the call for for unique mathematical equality rests neither on

    Page 412 U. S. 781

    a scholastic obsession with abstract numbers nor a inflexible insensitivity to the political realities of the reapportionment technique. Our paramount challenge has remained an man or woman and private right -- the proper to an same vote.

    "While the end result of a court docket decision in a kingdom legislative apportionment controversy can be to require the restructuring of the geographical distribution of seats in a nation legislature, the judicial cognizance have to be focused upon ascertaining whether or not there has been any discrimination in opposition to positive of the State s residents which constitutes an impermissible impairment in their constitutionally covered proper to vote."

    Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 410 U. S. 561. We have demanded equality in district populace precisely to insure that the weight of a person s vote will no longer rely on the district wherein he lives. The conclusion that a State might also, without any articulated justification, deliberately weight a few individuals votes extra heavily than others appears to me basically at odds with the cause and purpose of our reapportionment selections. Regrettably, nowadays s choices are likely to jeopardize the very good sized profits that have been made over the past 4 years.

    Moreover, if any method ascribes too much importance to summary numbers and too little to the realities of malapportionment, it isn't always Kirkpatrick s demand for specific equality in district populace, however as a substitute the Court s own de minimis method. By establishing an arbitrary cut-off point expressed in terms of general percent variance from the constitutional perfect, the Court fails to recognize that percent figures have a tendency to cover the overall range of individuals tormented by unequal weighting of votes. In the Texas case, for example, the District Court mentioned that

    "the full deviations for Dallas and Bexar Counties, respectively, amount to about 16,000 humans and five,500 people, for a total of round 21,500 human beings.

    Page 412 U. S. 782

    The percentage deviation figures are simplest a shorthand method of expressing the loss, dilution, or disproportionate weighting of votes. Just as the Court in Reynolds concluded that legislators represent people, not trees or cows, so we'd emphasize that legislators constitute people, no longer chances of people."

    343 F. Supp. at 713 n. 5.

    Finally, it's miles no answer to indicate that specific mathematical equality is an unsatisfactory purpose in view of the inevitable inaccuracies of the census facts on which the plans are primarily based. That argument, which we implicitly rejected in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, supra, [Footnote 2/8] mixes distinct questions. In the primary area, a state apportionment plan must be grounded at the maximum correct available records, and the unreliability of the information may itself necessitate the invalidation of the plan. But once the statistics are mounted, the State s constitutional obligation is to attain the very best potential degree of equality with regards to the facts to hand. In my view, the District Courts nicely concluded that neither Texas nor Connecticut had glad this obligation. I could consequently affirm both judgments.

    [Footnote 2/1]

    In Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433 (1965), we held that a multi-member district isn't in line with se unconstitutional below the Equal Protection Clause, even though we had previously identified certain inherently unwanted capabilities of the tool. See Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U. S. 713, 377 U. S. 731 n. 21 (1964). We have concluded, however, that the usage of the device is, in reality, unconstitutional, where it operates to "minimize or cancel out the balloting energy of racial or political elements of the voting populace, " Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. seventy three, 384 U. S. 88 (1966), quoting from Fortson v. Dorsey, supra, at 379 U. S. 439. Today s selection is the primary in which we've got sustained an attack on the use of multi-member districts. Cf. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 403 U. S. a hundred and forty four (1971).

    [Footnote 2/2]

    With regard to the senatorial districts, the 1971 plan produced a total variance of one.81%. Although appellees did now not specifically challenge the apportionment of senatorial districts, the District Court properly concluded that its locating of unconstitutional deviation in one residence required invalidation of the entire apportionment plan. Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U. S. 656, 377 U. S. 673 (1964); Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, supra, at 377 U. S. 735. Burns v. Richardson, supra, at 384 U. S. eighty three.

    [Footnote 2/three]

    The District Court mentioned that

    "the State s technique of computing deviations within the multi-member districts may additionally distort the real percent deviations in those eleven districts. . . . Since we've concluded that the nine.nine% overall deviation isn't the result of a good faith try to gain populace equality as nearly as achievable, it's miles pointless for us to remedy this complicated computational war."

    343 F. Supp. 704, 713 n. 5. A comparable struggle existed in Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. 315 (1973), as I talked about in my dissenting opinion, id. at 410 U. S. 333, and there too the Court declined to indicate any recognition of the dispute.

    [Footnote 2/4]

    There is a declaration, to be sure, in Swann v. Adams, 385 U. S. 440, 385 U. S. 444 (1967), that "[d]e minimis deviations are unavoidable," however that assertion need to be considered in context. By way of rationalization, the Court straight away added that

    "the Reynolds opinion constrained the allowable deviations to the ones minor variations which are primarily based on valid considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational kingdom policy. 377 U. S. 377 U.S. 533, 377 U.S. 579."

    Ibid. Similarly, the Court stated, quoting from Roman v. Sincock, 377 U. S. 695, 377 U. S. 710 (1964), that

    "the Constitution lets in such minor deviations only as may additionally occur in spotting certain elements which can be unfastened from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination. "

    385 U.S. at 385 U. S. 444. Swann v. Adams does not, in my view, advise any guide for the proposition that deviations as tremendous as 10% are tolerable inside the absence of any justification or rationalization through the State.

    [Footnote 2/five]

    By assessment, in Mahan v. Howell, supra, the Court expressly reaffirmed the preserving of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964), that

    "some deviations from the same population principle are constitutionally permissible . . . [s]o lengthy because the divergences from a strict population standard are based on valid issues incident to the effectuation of a rational country coverage."

    Id. at 377 U.S. 579, quoted in Mahan v. Howell, supra, at 410 U. S. 325 (emphasis delivered). In my view, the Court incorrectly concluded in Mahan v. Howell that Virginia had justified the populace variations at difficulty there. Nevertheless, the Court did follow the road of analysis prescribed in our earlier choices -- requiring the State to justify every deviation from unique equality. The method of Mahan is, therefore, at once at odds with the approach adopted today. See additionally, e.g., Abate v. Mundt, 403 U. S. 182, 403 U. S. 185 (1971); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U. S. a hundred and twenty, 386 U. S. 122 (1967); Swann v. Adams, supra, at 385 U. S. 443-446.

    [Footnote 2/6]

    Appellees figures are compiled from a table entitled Apportionment of Legislatures, in 17 Council of State Governments, the Book of the States: 1968-1969, pp. sixty six-67 (1968), and from Council of State Governments, Reapportionment inside the 1970s (1973).

    [Footnote 2/7]

    Deviations After 1970

    Percentage of

    Range of Deviations Number of States States


    Under 1% three 6.7%

    1-five% 21 forty six.7%

    5-10% 8 17.8%

    10-15% 5 11.1%

    Over 15% 8 17.8%


    Under 1% 4 nine five%

    1-5% sixteen 38.1%

    5-10% 8 19.1%

    10-15% four nine.five%

    Over 15% 10 23.8%

    [Footnote 2/eight]

    See 394 U.S. at 394 U. S. 538-540 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U. S. 542, 394 U. S. 554 (1969) (WHITE, J., dissenting).

    Oral Argument - February 26, 1973
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