, United States Nat. Bank of Ore. v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc. :: 508 U.S. 439 (1993) :: US LAW US Supreme Court Center

United States Nat. Bank of Ore. v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc. :: 508 U.S. 439 (1993) :: US LAW US Supreme Court Center

    OCTOBER TERM, 1992

    Syllabus

    UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK OF OREGON v.

    INDEPENDENT INSURANCE AGENTS OF AMERICA, INC., ET AL.

    CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

    No. 92-484. Argued April 19, 1993-Decided June 7,1993*

    The Act of Sept. 7, 1916, 39 Stat. 753 (1916 Act), amongst different things, authorized any countrywide financial institution doing enterprise in a community with a population no longer exceeding 5,000 to act as the agent for any coverage corporation. Although early variations of the USA Code included this provision as phase ninety two of Title 12 (segment ninety two), the 1952 Code and subsequent versions neglected section 92 with a word indicating that Congress had repealed it in 1918. Nevertheless, decoding segment 92 to allow banks placed in small groups to sell coverage out of doors the ones groups, petitioner Comptroller of the Currency dominated in 1986 that petitioner country wide financial institution ought to promote insurance via its department in a small Oregon city to clients national. Respondents, diverse trade businesses representing insurance retailers, added this in shape tough the Comptroller s selection as inconsistent with phase ninety two s terms. The District Court disagreed with that announcement and granted precis judgment for petitioners, noting that section 92 apparently became inadvertently repealed in 1918, however expressing the view that the availability exists "in proprio vigore." Respondents did no longer challenge phase 92 s validity within the District Court or the Court of Appeals, in spite of the latter court docket s invitation to accomplish that at oral argument. Only after that courtroom ordered supplemental briefing on the problem did respondents even urge the courtroom to clear up the query, whilst still taking no position on the deserves. In reversing and remanding with instructions to go into judgment for respondents, the Court of Appeals discovered first that, though the parties had now not on their very own wondered segment ninety two s validity, the courtroom had a obligation to do so, and, 2nd, that the applicable statutes, traditionally construed, validated that section ninety two become repealed in 1918.

    Held:

    1. The Court of Appeals had discretion to remember the validity of segment ninety two, and underneath the instances did now not abuse it. There is no doubt that the courtroom had before it an Article III case or controversy

    *Together with No. 92-507, Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, et al. v. Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc., et al., additionally on certiorari to the same court.


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    440 UNITED STATES NAT. BANK OF ORE. v. INDEPENDENT INS. AGENTS OF AMERICA, INC.

    Syllabus

    regarding segment 92 s popularity. Though the parties did now not lock horns over that issue, they did clash over whether or not the Comptroller properly depended on segment 92 as authority for his ruling. A court properly provided with an difficulty isn't always confined to the particular felony theories advanced by using the events, but retains the impartial electricity to pick out and practice the proper production of governing regulation, Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U. S. 90, 99, even in which that construction is that a regulation does not govern because it isn't always in pressure, cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 405 (Marshall, C. J.). Nor did prudence oblige the court docket beneath to treat the unasserted argument that section 92 were repealed as having been waived, on the grounds that a court docket can also remember an trouble antecedent to and in the long run dispositive of the dispute earlier than it, even if the parties fail to become aware of and quick the issue. Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U. S. seventy three, seventy seven. The court become asked to construe a statutory provision that the Code s keepers had advised changed into no longer in pressure, on appeal from a District Court justifying its reliance on the law by the common sense that, regardless of its "inadverten[tJ repea[l]," segment ninety two remained in impact of its very own force. After giving the parties sufficient possibility to deal with the problem, the court acted with none impropriety in refusing to simply accept what in effect was a stipulation at the question of law as to phase 92 s validity. Pp. 445-448.

    2. Section 92 turned into no longer repealed in 1918. Despite its omission from the Code, segment ninety two should remain on the books if the Statutes at Large, which offers "the legal proof of laws" below 1 U. S. C. § 112, so dictates. Viewed in isolation, the deployment of certain quotation marks within the 1916 Act appears to help the argument, adopted with the aid of the Court of Appeals and pressed through respondents, that the Act locations section ninety two in Rev. Stat. § 5202, and that segment ninety two changed into sooner or later repealed when the War Finance Corporation Act, ch. forty five, forty Stat. 506 (1918 Act), removed the relevant part of § 5202. An examination of the structure, language, and issue be counted of the relevant statutes, but, offers overwhelming evidence that, notwithstanding the position of the quotation marks in query, the 1916 Act positioned section 92 no longer in Rev. Stat. § 5202, but in § thirteen of the Federal Reserve Act. Since the 1918 Act did now not touch § thirteen, it did now not have an effect on, a whole lot less repeal, phase ninety two. It could seem that the misplacement of the quotation marks inside the 1916 Act turned into a simple scrivener s errors by means of a person unusual with the regulation s object and design. Courts need to push aside punctuation, or repunctuate, if necessary to render the authentic which means of a statute. Hammock v. Loan & Trnst Co., one hundred and five U. S. seventy seven,eighty four-85. pp.448-463.

    293 U. S. App. D. C. 403, 955 F.second 731, reversed and remanded.

    SOUTER, J., brought the opinion for a unanimous Court.


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    Full Text of Opinion

    OCTOBER TERM, 1992

    Syllabus

    UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK OF OREGON v.

    INDEPENDENT INSURANCE AGENTS OF AMERICA, INC., ET AL.

    CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

    No. ninety two-484. Argued April 19, 1993-Decided June 7,1993*

    The Act of Sept. 7, 1916, 39 Stat. 753 (1916 Act), amongst different things, authorized any national financial institution doing commercial enterprise in a network with a population now not exceeding five,000 to act because the agent for any insurance organization. Although early versions of the USA Code protected this provision as section 92 of Title 12 (section 92), the 1952 Code and next variations left out segment ninety two with a word indicating that Congress had repealed it in 1918. Nevertheless, decoding section 92 to allow banks located in small groups to sell insurance outside those groups, petitioner Comptroller of the Currency dominated in 1986 that petitioner country wide financial institution could sell insurance thru its department in a small Oregon town to clients national. Respondents, numerous alternate agencies representing insurance sellers, brought this in shape difficult the Comptroller s decision as inconsistent with phase ninety two s phrases. The District Court disagreed with that assertion and granted summary judgment for petitioners, noting that segment 92 reputedly changed into inadvertently repealed in 1918, however expressing the view that the supply exists "in proprio vigore." Respondents did now not undertaking segment ninety two s validity in the District Court or the Court of Appeals, notwithstanding the latter courtroom s invitation to achieve this at oral argument. Only after that court docket ordered supplemental briefing on the issue did respondents even urge the court docket to remedy the question, even as nevertheless taking no position on the deserves. In reversing and remanding with commands to go into judgment for respondents, the Court of Appeals discovered first that, though the events had now not on their very own wondered phase 92 s validity, the court had a duty to achieve this, and, 2nd, that the relevant statutes, historically construed, proven that phase 92 became repealed in 1918.

    Held:

    1. The Court of Appeals had discretion to keep in mind the validity of section 92, and beneath the occasions did no longer abuse it. There is no doubt that the court docket had earlier than it an Article III case or controversy

    *Together with No. 92-507, Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, et al. v. Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc., et al., additionally on certiorari to the equal court docket.


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    440 UNITED STATES NAT. BANK OF ORE. v. INDEPENDENT INS. AGENTS OF AMERICA, INC.

    Syllabus

    concerning segment 92 s status. Though the events did not lock horns over that trouble, they did conflict over whether or not the Comptroller well trusted section ninety two as authority for his ruling. A court docket nicely supplied with an trouble isn't limited to the unique criminal theories superior via the events, however keeps the impartial energy to identify and observe the proper creation of governing law, Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U. S. 90, ninety nine, even where that creation is that a law does now not govern because it isn't always in force, cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 405 (Marshall, C. J.). Nor did prudence oblige the court docket underneath to deal with the unasserted argument that segment 92 had been repealed as having been waived, when you consider that a courtroom may also recollect an issue antecedent to and ultimately dispositive of the dispute earlier than it, even supposing the parties fail to pick out and quick the issue. Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U. S. seventy three, 77. The court was requested to construe a statutory provision that the Code s keepers had recommended turned into no longer in pressure, on appeal from a District Court justifying its reliance on the law by way of the logic that, in spite of its "inadverten[tJ repea[l]," section ninety two remained in effect of its own force. After giving the events sufficient possibility to address the problem, the court acted with none impropriety in refusing to accept what in effect become a stipulation at the question of regulation as to segment 92 s validity. Pp. 445-448.

    2. Section 92 become now not repealed in 1918. Despite its omission from the Code, phase ninety two have to stay on the books if the Statutes at Large, which provides "the prison evidence of laws" under 1 U. S. C. § 112, so dictates. Viewed in isolation, the deployment of sure citation marks in the 1916 Act seems to guide the argument, followed by the Court of Appeals and pressed by means of respondents, that the Act locations segment ninety two in Rev. Stat. § 5202, and that section 92 was eventually repealed whilst the War Finance Corporation Act, ch. 45, forty Stat. 506 (1918 Act), removed the applicable portion of § 5202. An exam of the shape, language, and subject depend of the relevant statutes, but, presents overwhelming evidence that, regardless of the location of the citation marks in query, the 1916 Act placed segment ninety two now not in Rev. Stat. § 5202, however in § 13 of the Federal Reserve Act. Since the 1918 Act did no longer touch § 13, it did not affect, lots much less repeal, section 92. It might seem that the misplacement of the citation marks within the 1916 Act become a easy scrivener s error via someone unexpected with the law s object and design. Courts must disregard punctuation, or repunctuate, if vital to render the actual that means of a statute. Hammock v. Loan & Trnst Co., one zero five U. S. 77,84-85. pp.448-463.

    293 U. S. App. D. C. 403, 955 F.2nd 731, reversed and remanded.

    SOUTER, J., added the opinion for a unanimous Court.


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    Christopher J. Wright argued the purpose for petitioners in both instances and filed a brief for petitioners in No. ninety two-507. With him on the short were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Assistant Lawyer General Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Robert v: Zener, Jacob M. Lewis, William P. Bowden, Jr., Ernest C. Barrett III, and Lester N. Scall. Kenneth L. Bachman, Jr., and Michael R. Lazerwitz filed briefs for petitioner in No. 92-484.

    Ann M. Kappler argued the purpose for respondents in both instances. With her at the brief had been Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., and Nory Miller.t

    JUSTICE SOUTER brought the opinion of the Court.

    The Comptroller of the Currency lately depended on a statutory provision enacted in 1916 to permit countrywide banks located in small groups to sell coverage to customers out of doors the ones communities. These cases present the not likely question whether Congress repealed that provision in 1918. We preserve that no repeal happened.

    I

    Almost eighty years ago, Congress legal any country wide financial institution "doing enterprise in any region the population of which does not exceed 5 thousand population ... [to] act as the agent for any fireplace, life, or other insurance agency." Act of Sept. 7, 1916, 39 Stat. 753. In the first compilation of the USA Code, this provision regarded as segment 92 of Title 12. See 12 U. S. C. § ninety two (1926 ed.); see also United States Code variations of 1934, 1940, and 1946. The 1952 version of the Code, but, overlooked the insurance provision, with a be aware indicating that Congress had repealed it

    tJohn J. Gill III, Michael F. Crotty, Richard M. Whiting, Leonard J.

    Rubin, and John S. Jackson filed a short for the American Bankers Association et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.


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    442 UNITED STATES NAT. BANK OF ORE. v. INDEPENDENT INS. AGENTS OF AMERICA, INC.

    in 1918.1 See 12 U. S. C. § 92 (1952 ed.) (notice). Though the supply has additionally been disregarded of the subsequent versions of america Code, together with the contemporary one (each containing in substance the equal note that regarded in 1952, see United States Code versions of 1958, 1964, 1970, 1976, 1982, and 1988), the events consult with it as "segment 92," and so will we.

    Despite the absence of phase 92 from the Code, Congress has assumed that it stays in force, on one event clearly amending it. See Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, § 403(b), ninety six Stat. 1511; see additionally Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, § 201(b)(5), one zero one Stat. 583 (enforcing a i-yr moratorium on segment 92 sports). The regulators worried with the supply s challenge, the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve Board, have likewise acted on the know-how that section ninety two stays

    1 The note states that "[t]he provisions of this phase, which were brought to R. S. § 5202 through act Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 461, 39 Stat. 753, have been neglected in the modification of R. S. § 5202 by act Apr. 5, 1918, ch. 45, § 20, forty Stat. 512, and therefore this phase has been omitted from the Code." 12 U. S. C. § ninety two (1952 ed.) (be aware). We do not understand what triggered the 1952 codifiers to opposite the judgment in their predecessors. The 1952 codifiers choice, in conjunction with law that dealt with section 92 as valid law, seemingly precipitated a House of Representatives Committee to check the reputation of segment ninety two in 1957. See Financial Institutions Act of 1957: Hearings on S. 1451 and H. R. 7206 before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 85th Cong., second Sess., pt. 2, pp. 989-990, 1010-1025, 1036-1040, 1060-1071 (1957). After listening to conflicting testimony, the Committee took no action. See identity., at 1090, 1199. Several years later, congressional staffers explored the problem once more and concluded, with the codifiers, that Congress had repealed segment ninety two in 1918. See Consolidation of Bank Examining and Supervisory Functions: Hearings on H. R. 107 and H. R. 6885 earlier than the Subcommittee on Bank Supervision and Insurance of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 391 (1965). Though the realization turned into posted in a House Subcommittee Report, see ibid., neither the Subcommittee nor complete Committee took up the problem, and at no time has Congress tried to reenact what team of workers concept were repealed.


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    the regulation, see Brief for Federal Petitioners in No. 92-507, pp. 31-32; Brief for Petitioner in No. ninety two-484, pp. 26-28, and indeed it turned into a ruling with the aid of the Comptroller counting on section ninety two that precipitated these cases.2

    The ruling came on a request by means of United States National Bank of Oregon (Bank), a country wide bank with its most important place of business in Portland, Oregon, to sell insurance via its branch in Banks, Oregon (population: 489), to clients national. The Comptroller permitted the request in 1986, interpreting segment ninety two to permit national financial institution branches located in communities with populations now not exceeding five,000 to promote insurance to customers now not only inner however also outside those groups. See App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 92-507, pp. 74a-79a. The Bank is the petitioner in the first of the cases we decide these days; the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the US are the petitioners inside the other.

    Respondents in both instances are diverse alternate businesses representing coverage sellers. They challenged the Comptroller s selection within the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, claiming the Comptroller s ruling to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise no longer according with law" below the Administrative Procedure Act (AP A), five U. S. C. § 706(2)(A). Respondents argued,

    2 Courts too, which include this one, have assumed the validity of phase 92.

    See Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, N. A., 405 U. S. 394, 401-402 (1972); Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve System, 266 U. S. App. D. C. 356, 360, n. eight, 835 F.second 1452, 1456, n. 8 (1987); First National Bank of Lamarque v. Smith, 610 F. 2nd 1258, 1261, n. 6 (CA5 1980); Commissioner v. Morris Trust, 367 F.2nd 794, 795, n. three (CA4 1966); Genessee Trustee Corp. v. Smith, 102 F.second 125, 127 (CA6 1939); Washington Agency, Inc. v. Forbes, 309 Mich. 683, 684686, sixteen N. W. 2d 121, 121-122 (1944); Marshall Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Corder, 169 Va. 606, 609, 194 S. E. 734, 736 (1938); Greene v. First National Bank of Thief River Falls, 172 Minn. 310, 311-312, 215 N. W. 213, 213 (1927). But no court squarely addressed the question till the Court of Appeals under.


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    444 UNITED STATES NAT. BANK OF ORE. v. INDEPENDENT INS. AGENTS OF AMERICA, INC.

    amongst different things, that the ruling was inconsistent with phase ninety two, which respondents maintained permits national banks positioned in small communities to sell coverage best to customers in those groups. The District Court disagreed and granted precis judgment for the federal events and the Bank, a defendant-intervenor, at the ground that the Comptroller s interpretation become "rational and constant with [section 92]." National Assn. of Life Underwriters v. Clarke, 736 F. Supp. 1162, 1173 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation unnoticed). The District Court thought it "worth noting that this section not seems within the United States Code" because it "seemingly become inadvertently repealed" in 1918; but because Congress, the Comptroller, and different courts have presumed its continuing validity, the courtroom turned into content to expect that the supply exists "in proprio vigore," which means, we take it, of its personal pressure. Id., at 1163, n. 2.

    Respondents had not asked the District Court to rule that section 92 not existed, and they took the equal tack before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, merely noting in their beginning quick that segment ninety two may additionally had been repealed in 1918 after which pointing out that each one the relevant players had assumed its validity. The Court of Appeals, nevertheless, directed the events to be organized to deal with the status of section 92 at oral argument, and after oral argument (at which respondents counsel declined to argue that the supply turned into not in pressure) ordered supplemental briefing on the problem. In their supplemental brief, respondents entreated the courtroom to determine the question, however took no function on whether phase 92 became valid law. The Court of Appeals did decide the problem, reversing the District Court s decision and remanding with commands to enter judgment for respondents. The court determined first that, although the events had now not on their own puzzled the validity of segment ninety two, the court docket had a "duty" to achieve this, Independent


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    Ins. Agents of America, Inc. v. Clarke, 293 U. S. App. D. C. 403, 406, 955 F.second 731, 734 (1992); and, second, that the applicable statutes, "historically construed," exhibit that Congress repealed segment ninety two in 1918, id., at 407, 955 F. second, at 735. Judge Silberman, dissenting, could have affirmed with out addressing the validity of section ninety two, an issue he concept was no longer well earlier than the court. Id., at 413-416, 955 F. 2d, at 741-744. The Court of Appeals denied respondents concept for rehearing en bane, with numerous judges submitting separate statements. See 296 U. S. App. D. C. one hundred fifteen, 965

    The Bank and the federal events one at a time petitioned for certiorari, each petitions presenting the query whether section 92 stays in pressure and the Bank imparting the additional query whether the Court of Appeals well addressed the difficulty. Because of a battle at the important question whether or not phase 92 is valid law, see American Land Title Assn. v. Clarke, 968 F.2nd a hundred and fifty, 151-154 (CA2 1992), cert. pending, Nos. ninety two-482, 92-645, we granted the petitions. 506 U. S. 1032 (1992). We now reverse.

    II

    Before turning to the reputation of segment 92, we cope with the Bank s threshold question, whether the Court of Appeals erred in thinking about the difficulty at all. Respondents did not undertaking the validity of segment 92 before the District Court; they did now not accomplish that of their beginning quick in the Court of Appeals or, in spite of the court s invitation, at oral argument. Not until the Court of Appeals ordered supplemental briefing at the fame of section ninety two did respondents even urge the courtroom to clear up the problem, whilst nevertheless taking no function at the merits. The Bank contends that the Court of Appeals lacked the authority to do not forget whether or not segment ninety two remains the regulation and, alternatively, that it abused its discretion in doing so. There isn't any want to linger long over both argument.


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    446 UNITED STATES NAT. BANK OF ORE. v. INDEPENDENT INS. AGENTS OF AMERICA, INC.

    "The workout of judicial strength under Art. III of the Constitution depends at the lifestyles of a case or controversy," and "a federal courtroom [lacks] the electricity to render advisory evaluations." Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401 (1975); see additionally Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. eighty three, 97 (1968). The Bank keeps that there has been no case or controversy about the validity of segment 92, and that in resolving the repute of the availability the Court of Appeals violated the Article III prohibition in opposition to advisory opinions.

    There is not any doubt, however, that from the begin respondents in shape became the "pursuance of an sincere and real antagonistic announcement of rights by using one [party] against any other," Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 359 (1911) (internal citation marks and citation left out), that "treasured criminal rights ... [would] be at once affected to a specific and great diploma" through a selection on whether or not the Comptroller s ruling turned into right and lawful, Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 262 (1933), and that the Court of Appeals therefore had earlier than it a real case and controversy extending to that difficulty. Though the parties did now not lock horns over the fame of segment 92, they did clash over whether or not the Comptroller nicely trusted section 92 as authority for his ruling, and "[w]chicken an trouble or claim is nicely earlier than the courtroom, the court docket is not constrained to the unique legal theories superior with the aid of the events, but as an alternative retains the impartial power to identify and apply the proper creation of governing law," Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U. S. ninety, 99 (1991), even in which the right production is that a law does not govern as it is not in force. "The judicial Power" extends to instances "springing up under ... the Laws of the United States," Art. III, § 2, cl. 1, and a court nicely asked to construe a law has the constitutional electricity to determine whether the law exists, cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 405 (1821) ("[I]f, in any controversy depending in a court docket, the reason ought to rely upon the validity of this sort of regulation, that would be a case bobbing up under


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    the constitution, to which the judicial power of the United States might enlarge") (Marshall, C. J.). The contrary end could allow litigants, through agreeing at the felony difficulty offered, to extract the opinion of a courtroom on hypothetical Acts of Congress or doubtful constitutional standards, an opinion that would be tough to represent as some thing but advisory.

    Nor did prudence oblige the Court of Appeals to deal with the unasserted argument that segment 92 were repealed as having been waived. Respondents argued from the begin, as we stated, that section 92 became now not authority for the Comptroller s ruling, and a court may additionally do not forget an issue "antecedent to ... and in the end dispositive of" the dispute earlier than it, even an trouble the parties fail to perceive and brief. Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U. S. 73, 77 (1990); cf. Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton Int l, Inc., ante, at 88-89, n. nine (addressing a prison query as to which the events agreed on the solution). The omission of segment 92 from the USA Code, furthermore, together with the codifiers indication that the supply had been repealed, created honest doubt approximately whether section 92 existed as law, and a court docket "want not render judgment on the basis of a rule of law whose nonexistence is obvious on the face of things, simply due to the fact the parties agree upon it." United States v. Burke, 504 U. S. 229, 246 (1992) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). While the Bank says that by to begin with accepting the widespread assumption that section 92 remains in force, respondents forfeited their proper to have the Court of Appeals do not forget whether or not the regulation exists, "[t]right here may be no estoppel in the way of ascertaining the life of a regulation," South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260, 267 (1877). In addressing the popularity of phase 92, the Court of Appeals did not stray past its constitutional or prudential boundaries.

    The Court of Appeals, hence, had discretion to bear in mind the validity of phase ninety two, and underneath the situations did not abuse it. The court docket turned into requested to determine underneath


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    the AP A whether or not the Comptroller s ruling become according with a statutory provision that the keepers of the USA Code had counseled become now not in pressure, on appeal from a District Court justifying its reliance at the law by way of the good judgment that, no matter its "inadverten[t] repea[l]," segment ninety two remained in effect of its own pressure. 736 F. Supp., at 1163, n. 2. After giving the parties sufficient opportunity to address the issue, the Court of Appeals acted without any impropriety in refusing to accept what in effect was a stipulation on a question of regulation. Cf. Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley R. Co., 243 U. S. 281, 289 (1917). We need no longer decide whether the Court of Appeals had, as it concluded, a "obligation" to cope with the popularity of section 92 (which could mean error in declining to do so), for the courtroom s selection to bear in mind the issue changed into surely no abuse of its discretion.

    III A

    Though the advent of a provision inside the modern-day version of america Code is "prima facie" proof that the provision has the force of regulation, 1 U. S. C. § 204(a), it's miles the Statutes at Large that gives the "criminal evidence of laws," § 112, and despite its omission from the Code segment 92 remains at the books if the Statutes at Large so dictates.three Cf. United States v. Welden, 377 U. S. ninety five, ninety eight, n. 4 (1964); Stephan v. United States, 319 U. S. 423, 426 (1943) (per curiam). The evaluation that underlies our conclusion that phase ninety two is legitimate law calls for familiarity with several provisions acting inside the Statutes at Large. This phase offers the vital statutory history.

    three When Congress has enacted a name of the Code as wonderful regulation (as it has carried out, as an instance, with Title eleven, the Bankruptcy Code, see § one zero one, ninety two Stat. 2549), the text of the Code offers "criminal evidence of the laws." 1 U. S. C. § 204(a). But Congress has no longer enacted as nice law Title 12, wherein phase ninety two for a time appeared.


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    The heritage starts offevolved in 1863 and 1864, when the Civil War Congress enacted after which reenacted the National Bank Act, which launched the modern-day national banking machine by means of presenting for federal chartering of private business banks and empowering the newly created countrywide banks to difficulty and take delivery of a uniform national foreign money. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665; Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, thirteen Stat. 99; see E. Symons, Jr., & J. White, Banking Law 22-25 (3d ed. 1991); see additionally 12 U. S. C. § 38. In a segment critical for those cases, the National Bank Act set limits on the indebtedness of countrywide banks, situation to positive exceptions. See § forty two, 12 Stat. 677 (1863 Act); § 36, 13 Stat. a hundred and ten (1864 Act). Ten years later, Congress followed the indebtedness provision once more as part of the Revised Statutes of the United States, a massive revision, reorganization, and reenactment of all statutes in impact at the time, observed by using a simultaneous repeal of all previous ones. Rev. Stat. §§ 1-5601 (1874); see also Dwan & Feidler, The Federal Statutes-Their History and Use, 22 Minn. L. Rev. 1008, 1012-1015 (1938).4 Title 62 of the Revised Statutes, containing §§ 5133 thru 5243, protected the Nation s banking legal guidelines, and, with a few stylistic changes, the National Bank Act s indebtedness provision became § 5202 of the Revised Statutes:

    SEC. 5202. No affiliation shall at any time be indebted, or in any way liable, to an quantity exceeding the quantity of its capital inventory at such time sincerely paid

    4The 1874 edition of the Revised Statutes marked the last time Congress codified United States laws through reenacting all of them. An 1878 version of the Revised Statutes up to date the authentic Revised Statutes, however become now not enacted as tremendous law. See Act of Mar. nine, 1878, ch. 26, 20 Stat. 27; Act of Mar. 2, 1877, ch. eighty two, 19 Stat. 268. In 1919, the House Committee on the Revision of the Laws of the USA started out work on what ultimately have become the United States Code, the first edition of which changed into published in 1926. See forty four Stat., pt. 1; Dwan & Feidler, 22 Minn. L. Rev., at 1018-1021.


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    in and last undiminished by means of losses or otherwise, except as a result of demands of the nature following:

    First. Notes of movement.

    Second. Moneys deposited with or gathered through the affiliation.

    Third. Bills of trade or drafts drawn in opposition to cash truely on deposit to the credit score of the affiliation, or due thereto.

    Fourth. Liabilities to the stockholders of the affiliation for dividends and reserved profits.5

    In 1913 Congress amended Rev. Stat. § 5202 by including a fifth exception to the indebtedness restrict. The modification was a element of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 (Federal Reserve Act or 1913 Act), which created Federal Reserve banks and the Federal Reserve Board and required the country wide banks formed pursuant to the National Bank Act to come to be members of the brand new Federal Reserve System. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251; see P. Studenski & H. Krooss, Financial History of the United States 255262 (2d ed. 1963). The modification came in § 13 of the 1913 Act, the primary five paragraphs of which set forth the powers of the brand new Federal Reserve banks, together with the authority to simply accept and discount numerous styles of notes and industrial paper, which includes the ones issued by means of countrywide banks. Federal Reserve Act, § thirteen,38 Stat. 263-264. This (challenge to ellipsis) accompanied:

    Section fifty-two hundred and of the Revised Statutes of the United States is hereby amended if you want to study as follows: No countrywide banking association shall

    5 Because of the significance in those instances of the region of quotation marks, we go away from our regular fashion concerning block quotations and reproduce citation marks handiest as they seem in the original materials. Here, as an instance, we've now not opened and closed Rev. Stat. § 5202 with citation marks because none appear inside the Revised Statutes. See additionally n. 6, infra.


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    at any time be indebted, or in any manner dependable, to an amount exceeding the amount of its capital stock at such time honestly paid in and ultimate undiminished by way of losses or otherwise, except resulting from needs of the nature following:

    Fifth. Liabilities incurred below the provisions of the

    Federal Reserve Act.

    38 Stat. 264. The next and final paragraph of § thirteen authorized the Federal Reserve Board to problem regulations governing the rediscount by using Federal Reserve banks of payments receivable and bills of exchange. Ibid.

    In 1916, Congress enacted what became section ninety two. It did so as part of a statute that amended various sections of the Federal Reserve Act and that, in the view of respondents and the Court of Appeals, additionally amended Rev. Stat. § 5202. Act of Sept. 7, 1916, 39 Stat. 752 (1916 Act). Unlike the 1913 Act, the 1916 Act hired citation marks, and people citation marks proved vital to the Court of Appeals s finding that the 1916 Act placed phase ninety two in Rev. Stat. § 5202. After amending § eleven of the Federal Reserve Act, the 1916 Act supplied, without citation marks,

    [t]hat section thirteen be, and is hereby, amended to

    study as follows:

    Ibid. Then followed inside quotation marks numerous paragraphs that song the first 5 paragraphs of § thirteen of the 1913 Act, the modifications generally increasing the powers of Federal Reserve banks. After the quotation marks closed, this appeared:

    Section fifty- hundred and of the Revised Statutes of america is hereby amended on the way to read as follows: "No national banking affiliation shall at any time be indebted, or in any way dependable, to an quantity exceeding the amount of its capital inventory at such time clearly paid in and ultimate undiminished with the aid of


    452

    452 UNITED STATES NAT. BANK OF ORE. v. INDEPENDENT INS. AGENTS OF AMERICA, INC.

    losses or in any other case, besides on account of needs of the nature following:

    "First. Notes of stream.

    "Second. Moneys deposited with or accrued by way of the affiliation.

    "Third. Bills of change or drafts drawn towards cash sincerely on deposit to the credit of the affiliation, or due thereto.

    "Fourth. Liabilities to the stockholders of the association for dividends and reserve profits.

    "Fifth. Liabilities incurred beneath the provisions of the Federal reserve Act.

    "The cut price and rediscount and the purchase and sale by means of any Federal reserve financial institution of any bills receivable and of domestic and foreign bills of trade, and of acceptances legal through this Act, shall be problem to such regulations, obstacles, and rules as may be imposed via the Federal Reserve Board.

    "That similarly to the powers now vested by using law in country wide banking associations prepared under the laws of the US such a association placed and doing commercial enterprise in any area the populace of which does no longer exceed five thousand inhabitants, as proven by way of the last previous decennial census, may additionally, under such policies and rules as may be prescribed with the aid of the Comptroller of the Currency, act as the agent for any hearth, existence, or different coverage organisation authorized via the authorities of the State in which stated financial institution is positioned to do enterprise in stated State ....

    "Any member bank might also be given drafts or payments of alternate drawn upon it having not extra than 3 months sight to run, different of days of grace, drawn below guidelines to be prescribed by way of the Federal Reserve Board by banks or bankers in overseas countries or dependencies or insular possessions of the US for the motive of furnishing dollar exchange as re-


    453

    quired by way of the usages of alternate within the respective international locations, dependencies, or insular possessions. Such drafts or payments can be obtained with the aid of Federal reserve banks in such quantities and challenge to such guidelines, regulations, and obstacles as may be prescribed by way of the Federal Reserve Board .... "

    39 Stat. 753-754. The 2d-to-Iast paragraph simply quoted is the primary look of the supply subsequently codified as 12 U. S. C. § 92. After the citation marks closed, the 1916 Act went directly to amend § 14 of the Federal Reserve Act, introducing the amendment with a word not surrounded by means of citation marks after which setting the revised language of § 14 within quotation marks. 39 Stat. 754. The pattern become repeated for amendments of §§ sixteen, 24, and 25 of the Federal Reserve Act. Id., at 754-756.

    The final relevant statute is the War Finance Corporation Act, ch. 45, forty Stat. 506 (1918 Act), which in § 20 amended Rev. Stat. § 5202 by means of, as a minimum, adding a 6th exception to the indebtedness limit:

    SEC. 20. Section fifty-two hundred and two of the Revised Statutes of the US is hereby amended with a purpose to read as follows:

    "SEC. 5202. No national banking affiliation shall at any time be indebted, or in any way in charge, to an quantity exceeding the amount of its capital inventory at such time truely paid in and ultimate undiminished with the aid of losses or otherwise, besides on account of needs of the character following:

    "Sixth. Liabilities incurred underneath the provisions of the War Finance Corporation Act."

    40 Stat. 512.

    B

    The argument that section ninety two is now not in pressure, adopted by the Court of Appeals and pressed right here by means of respondents, is


    454

    454 UNITED STATES NAT. BANK OF ORE. v. INDEPENDENT INS. AGENTS OF AMERICA, INC.

    in reality stated: the 1916 Act located section ninety two in Rev. Stat. § 5202, and the 1918 Act removed all of Rev. Stat. § 5202 except the indebtedness provision (to which it delivered a sixth exception), therefore repealing section ninety two. Our discussion starts with the first premise of that argument, and there it ends, for we conclude with petitioners that the 1916 Act positioned segment 92 now not in Rev. Stat. § 5202 however in § thirteen of the Federal Reserve Act; since the 1918 Act did not touch § 13, it did no longer have an effect on, a lot much less repeal, phase 92.

    A reader following the course of punctuation of the 1916 Act might absolute confidence arrive at the other conclusion, that the statute brought segment 92 to Rev. Stat. § 5202. The 1916 Act reads, without quotation marks, Section fifty-two hundred and two of the Revised Statutes of the USA is hereby amended so one can examine as fo llows. 6 39 Stat. 753. That word is followed by means of a colon after which establishing citation marks; remaining citation marks do not seem until numerous paragraphs later, and the paragraph that turned into later codified as 12 U. S. C. § ninety two is one of these inside the beginning and final quotation marks. The unavoidable inference from familiar regulations of punctuation is that the 1916 Act positioned section 92 in Rev. Stat. § 5202.

    A statute s undeniable meaning need to be enforced, of route, and the meaning of a statute will typically heed the instructions of its punctuation. But a purported plain-which means analysis primarily based simplest on punctuation is always incomplete and runs the risk of distorting a statute s true meaning. Along with punctuation, text includes words dwelling "a communal existence," in Judge Learned Hand s phrase, the meaning of every word informing the others and "all in their combination tak[ing] their purport from the placing wherein they may be used." NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2nd 954, 957 (CA2

    6 Because the location of quotation marks is critical in those cases, the quotations within the textual content from the 1916 and 1913 Acts appear in italics in order no longer to introduce quotation marks absent from the Statutes at Large. See n. five, supra.


    455

    1941). Over and over we've got stressed that "[i]n expounding a statute, we must now not be guided through a single sentence or member of a sentence, but appearance to the provisions of the whole law, and,to its object and policy." United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 8 How. 113, 122 (1849) (quoted in more than a dozen cases, most currently Dole v. Steelworkers, 494 U. S. 26, 35 (1990)); see also King v. St. Vincent s Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 221 (1991). No more than isolated phrases or sentences is punctuation by myself a reliable manual for discovery of a statute s which means. Statutory production "is a holistic undertaking," United Savings Assn. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371 (1988), and, at a minimum, ought to account for a statute s complete text, language as well as punctuation, structure, and challenge matter.

    Here, even though the deployment of quotation marks within the 1916 Act factors in one course, all the other evidence from the statute points the alternative manner. It factors so definitely, in our view, as to allow best the belief that the punctuation marks have been misplaced and that the 1916 Act put segment 92 now not in Rev. Stat. § 5202 but in § 13 of the Federal Reserve Act.7

    The first component to observe, we suppose, is the 1916 Act s structure. The Act starts by stating [t]hat the Act entitled

    7 Contrary to respondents argument, the Marshall Field doctrine does now not avert us from asking whether or not the statute means some thing other than what the punctuation dictates. The Marshall Field doctrine, certainly, is beside the point to this example. In Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 672 (1892), the Court said that a regulation consists of the "enrolled invoice," signed in open session by using the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, see also 1 U. S. C. § 106, but there may be no question in these cases that the 1916 Act as published within the Statutes at Large is identical to the enrolled bill. The Marshall Field doctrine issues " the character of the proof the Court [may] take into account in determining whether or not a bill had honestly passed Congress," United States v. MunozFlores, 495 U. S. 385, 391, n. four (1990) (quoting Marshall Field, supra, at 670); it locations no limits at the proof a court docket may recall in figuring out the that means of a invoice that has exceeded Congress.


    456

    456 UNITED STATES NAT. BANK OF ORE. v. INDEPENDENT INS. AGENTS OF AMERICA, INC.

    "Federal reserve Act," approved [1913J, be, and is hereby, amended as follows. 39 Stat. 752. It then incorporates what seem like seven directory phrases no longer surrounded via quotation marks, each of that's followed by one or extra paragraphs inside beginning and last quotation marks. These are the seven phrases (the numbers and citations in brackets are ours):

    [1] At the quit of segment 11 insert a new clause as follows:

    " ... " [39 Stat. 752]

    [2] That segment thirteen be, and is hereby, amended to read as follows:

    " ... " [39 Stat. 752]

    [3] Section fifty- hundred and of the Revised Statutes of the United States is hereby amended if you want to read as follows:

    " ••• " eight [39 Stat. 753]

    [4] That subsection (e) of section fourteen, be, and is hereby, amended to examine as follows:

    " ... " [39 Stat. 754]

    [5] That the second paragraph of section 16 be, and is hereby, amended to study as follows:

    " ... " [39 Stat. 754]

    [6] That segment twenty-four be, and is hereby, amended to read as follows:

    " ... " [39 Stat. 754]

    [7] That segment twenty-five be, and is hereby, amended to read as follows:

    " ... " [39 Stat. 755]

    The paragraph finally codified as 12 U. S. C. § 92 is one among several within the quotation marks that open after the

    8 That the textual content inside citation marks follows the third listing phrase straight away after a area, in preference to after a paragraph break, is sizeable. See n. nine, infra.


    457

    third word, which "hereby amended" Rev. Stat. § 5202, and that near earlier than the fourth, and the argument that the 1916 Act located segment ninety two in Rev. Stat. § 5202 hinges on the assumption that the third word is a listing phrase like every of the others. But the shape of the Act helps another possibility, that the 0.33 word does now not introduce a brand new change in any respect. Of the seven phrases, handiest the third does no longer in phrases check with a phase of the Federal Reserve Act. Congress, to make sure, changed into loose to take a detour from its paintings on the Federal Reserve Act to revise the Revised Statutes. But if Congress had taken that flip, one might anticipate a few textual indication of the point wherein as soon as its work on Rev. Stat. § 5202 turned into done it again to revision of the Federal Reserve Act. None of the listing phrases that follow the phrase bringing up Rev. Stat. § 5202, however, refers back to the Federal Reserve Act. The failure of the fourth word, as an example, to say something like "subsection (e) of phase fourteen of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 is hereby amended" indicates that the Congress never veered from its unique course, that the item of the 1916 Act become singlemindedly to revise sections of the Federal Reserve Act, and that amending the Revised Statutes became past the 1916 regulation s scope.

    Further proof that the 1916 Act amended only the Federal Reserve Act comes from the 1916 Act s title: An Act To amend sure sections of the Act entitled "Federal reserve Act," approved December twenty-1/3, nineteen hundred and 13. During this period the titles of statutes that revised pre-present legal guidelines seem to have generally cited each of the laws they revised. See, e. g., Act of Sept. 26, 1918, ch. 177, forty Stat. 967 ("An Act to amend and reenact sections four, eleven, sixteen, nineteen, and twenty-two of the Act authorised December twenty-third, nineteen hundred and thirteen, and known as the Federal reserve Act, and sections fifty- hundred and 8 and fifty-two hundred and nine, Revised Statutes"). Cf. ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 ("Federal


    458

    458 UNITED STATES NAT. BANK OF ORE. v. INDEPENDENT INS. AGENTS OF AMERICA, INC.

    Reserve Act"). Absent a comprehensive evaluation it's far not possible to understand the quantity of exceptions to this popular rule, if any, and we might now not forged apart the 1916 Act s punctuation based completely on the Act s name. Nevertheless, the omission of the Revised Statutes from the 1916 Act s title does offer helping proof for the inference from the Act s shape, that the Act did now not amend Rev. Stat. § 5202. Cf. INS v. National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc., 502 U. S. 183, 189 (1991) (titles within a statute "can aid in resolving an ambiguity within the rules s textual content").

    One must ask, but, why the 1916 Act said that Sectionfifty-two hundred and two of the Revised Statutes of the USA is hereby amended which will examine as follows, 39 Stat. 753, if it did not amend Rev. Stat. § 5202. The solution emerges from comparing the 1916 Act with the statute that all agree it did amend, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, and noticing that the same directory word seemed in § 13 of the 1913 Act, which did amend Rev. Stat. § 5202. As enacted in 1913, § 13 contained numerous paragraphs granting powers to Federal Reserve banks; it then blanketed a paragraph amending Rev. Stat. § 5202 (through adding a 5th exception to the indebtedness restriction for "[l]iabilities incurred under the provisions of the Federal Reserve Act"), a paragraph that started Section fifty- hundred and two of the Revised Statutes of the US is hereby amended so that you can read as follows. 38 Stat. 264. The 1916 Act, within the element following the word introducing a revision of § thirteen of the 1913 Act, proceeded in the equal manner. It contained numerous paragraphs granting powers to Federal Reserve banks, paragraphs which are quite revised variations of the ones that seemed inside the 1913 Act, accompanied via the word introducing an amendment to Rev. Stat. § 5202 after which the language of Rev. Stat. § 5202 as it regarded in the 1913 Act. The similarity of the language of the 1916 and 1913 Acts shows that, that allows you to amend § 13 in 1916, Congress restated the 1913 model of § 13 in its entirety, revising the component it


    459

    meant to exchange and leaving the rest unaltered, inclusive of the element that had amended Rev. Stat. § 5202.nine

    In defending the Court of Appeals s contrary conclusion that the 1916 Act amended Rev. Stat. § 5202, respondents argue that every other studying could render meaningless the language within the 1916 Act that purports to amend that segment of the Revised Statutes. But the 1916 Congress could have had top motive to hold forward that portion of the 1913 Act containing Rev. Stat. § 5202, even though in 1916 it did no longer intend to amend it any in addition. The 1916 Act revised § 13 of the 1913 Act with the aid of absolutely restating it with a aggregate of vintage and new language (offering that § thirteen is amended "to read as follows," 39 Stat. 752), and a failure to restate Rev. Stat. § 5202 with its 1913 change might have been taken to signify its repeal.

    The very last and decisive evidence that the 1916 Act located section 92 in § thirteen of the Federal Reserve Act rather than Rev. Stat. § 5202 is furnished by using the language and issue matter of phase 92 and the paragraphs surrounding it, paragraphs in the same starting and remaining citation marks. In the paragraph preceding section ninety two, the 1916 Act granted the Federal Reserve Board authority to adjust the

    bargain and rediscount and the purchase and sale through any Federal reserve financial institution of any payments receivable and of home and foreign payments of change, and of acceptances authorized by this Act ....

    39 Stat. 753 (emphasis brought). "[T]his Act" need to mean the Federal Reserve Act, since it changed into § thirteen of the Federal Re-

    nine A assessment of the layout of the two Acts components further guide for the conclusion that the 1916 Act restated the 1913 Act in complete, and did not newly amend Rev. Stat. § 5202. With one exception, a paragraph smash separates every of the introductory phrases in the 1916 Act from the textual content that follows inside quotation marks. The exception is the word bringing up Rev. Stat. § 5202, the textual content within citation marks following on the identical line after handiest a area. That, considerably, is exactly the format of the modification to Rev. Stat. § 5202 in § 13 of the 1913 Act.


    460

    460 UNITED STATES NAT. BANK OF ORE. v. INDEPENDENT INS. AGENTS OF AMERICA, INC.

    serve Act that granted banks the authority to cut price and rediscount. Use of "this Act" in the discount-and-rediscount paragraph is strong evidence that the 1916 Act located that paragraph within the Act to which it necessarily refers, the Federal Reserve Act. That is vital due to the fact phase 92 travels together with the paragraphs that surround it; neither the language nor, definitely, the punctuation of the 1916 Act justifies setting apart them. Because the 1916 Act positioned the paragraph preceding phase 92 in § thirteen of the Federal Reserve Act, it follows that the 1916 Act located phase ninety two there too.

    We aren't persuaded through respondents argument that the time period "this Act" inside the bargain-and-rediscount paragraph is an antecedent reference to "the Federal reserve Act," that's referred to within the previous paragraph (in the 5th exception clause of Rev. Stat. § 5202). 39 Stat. 753; see also 38 Stat. 264 (1913 Act). If respondents are proper, then the 1916 Act may be study as setting the cut price-and-rediscount paragraph (and phase 92, which always accompanies it) in Rev. Stat. § 5202. But whilst the antecedent interpretation is debatable as construing "this Act" within the bargain-andrediscount paragraph, that reading can not connect to the alternative uses of "this Act" inside the 1916 Act, see 39 Stat. 752, 753, 754, on the grounds that none is in the place of a reference to the Federal Reserve Act. Presumptively," equal phrases utilized in special elements of the equal act are meant to have the identical meaning, " Commissioner v. Keystone Consolo Industries, Inc., ante, at 159 (quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 433 (1932)), and due to the fact that not anything rebuts that presumption here, we are of the view that each use of "this Act" in the 1916 Act refers back to the Act wherein the language is contained. Rather than aiding respondents, then, the single complete connection with "the Federal reserve Act" inside the part of the 1916 Act that amended Rev. Stat. § 5202 cuts in opposition to them. The reality that it changed into no longer repeated inside the next paragraph confirms that the statute s citation of Rev. Stat. § 5202 had ended.


    461

    Finally, the concern remember of the bargain-and-rediscount paragraph (positioned, once more, inside the equal establishing and remaining citation marks as segment ninety two) confirms that the 1916 Act placed segment ninety two within the Federal Reserve Act. The discountand-rediscount paragraph topics sure powers of Federal Reserve banks to law by the Federal Reserve Board. The logic of finding this provision in the Federal Reserve Act is obvious, while there would have been no motive for Congress to region it in Rev. Stat. § 5202, which narrowly addressed the indebtedness of national banks, or maybe inside the National Bank Act (from which Rev. Stat. § 5202 derived), which concerned now not public Federal Reserve banks or the Federal Reserve Board, however personal national banks. Similarly, the paragraph following section 92, which authorizes Federal Reserve banks to gather overseas drafts or payments of change from member banks and subjects transactions regarding foreign acceptances to Federal Reserve Board rules, fits a ways extra easily with § 13 of the Federal Reserve Act than with Rev. Stat. § 5202. While we do not disagree with respondents insofar as they assert that Congress could have positioned phase 92, granting powers of insurance corporation to a few countrywide banks (and without mentioning Federal Reserve banks or the Federal Reserve Board), in Rev. Stat. § 5202, Congress can also moderately have treated the coverage provision as a part of the Federal Reserve Act, which Congress had before it for change in 1916. There is not any want to interrupt that tie, but, because there is no manner around the end that the 1916 Act placed phase ninety two in the same statutory vicinity because it ought to have positioned its acquaintances, in § 13 of the Federal Reserve Act.10

    10 Respondents point out that it would now not have been absurd for Congress to have amended Rev. Stat. § 5202 in the middle of the 1916 Act. We agree, and of direction there's no dispute that Congress 3 years earlier amended Rev. Stat. § 5202 in the middle of the 1913 Act. Both drafting choices strike us as extraordinary, though neither might be with out possible cause. The 1913 Congress may properly have concept it handy to


    462

    462 UNITED STATES NAT. BANK OF ORE. v. INDEPENDENT INS. AGENTS OF AMERICA, INC.

    Against the overpowering evidence from the shape, language, and situation count of the 1916 Act there stands most effective the proof from the Act s punctuation, too susceptible to trump the relaxation. In these unusual instances, we are satisfied that the position of the citation marks inside the 1916 Act became a simple scrivener s errors, a mistake made through a person surprising with the law s object and design. Courts, we have said, must "brush aside the punctuation, or repunctuate, if want be, to render the genuine meaning of the statute." Hammock v. Loan & Trust Co., one zero five U. S. seventy seven, 84-85 (1882) (inner citation marks and citation disregarded). The proper that means of the 1916 Act is apparent beyond question, and so we repunctuate. The 1916 Act ought to be examine as if last quotation marks do no longer appear on the quit of the paragraph earlier than the phrase Section fifty-two hundred and two of the Revised Statutes of the US is hereby amended which will study as follows, 39 Stat. 753, and as if the outlet quotation marks that straight away comply with that word instead precede it. Accordingly, the 1916 Act placed inside § thirteen of the Federal Reserve Act every of the paragraphs between the terms that introduce the amendments to §§ thirteen and 14 of the Federal Reserve Act, along with the paragraph that became later codified as 12 U. S. C. § ninety two. Because the 1918 Act did not amend the Federal Reserve Act, it did no longer repeal

    upload the exception from Rev. Stat. § 5202 s indebtedness restrict for "[l]iabilities incurred below the provisions of the Federal Reserve Act" without delay after the language inside the Federal Reserve Act that might bring about the liabilities of problem, language that legal national banks to accept positive drafts and bills of trade. 38 Stat. 264. And the 1916 Congress should conceivably have located it similarly handy to amend Rev. Stat. § 5202, which appeared within the Act it was amending on the time. The factor of our evaluation, however, isn't always that Congress could not probable have amended Rev. Stat. § 5202 inside the middle of the 1916 Act, however that the excellent studying of the Act, regardless of the punctuation marks, is that Congress did something else.


    463

    phase 92, no matter the Court of Appeals s end to the opposite. 11

    Section 92 stays in force, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed. These instances are remanded for further complaints regular with this opinion.

    So ordered.

    eleven Because we conclude that the which means of the 1916 Act is apparent, and because respondents do not argue that the law s plain meaning is "demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters," Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U. S. 564, 571 (1982), we need not take into account the 1916 Act s legislative records. Nor want we remember, once more due to the fact the statute s meaning is unambiguous, what if any weight to accord the longstanding assumption of each the Comptroller and the Federal Reserve Board that segment 92 survived the 1918 change of Rev. Stat. § 5202. See Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U. S. 158, 171 (1989).

    We word eventually, seeing that respondents enhance the point, that our remark in Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 502 (1936), that the 1916 Act "amends [sections of the Federal Reserve Act], and § 5202 of the Revised Statutes" is manifestly now not controlling, coming as it did in an opinion that did no longer present the question we decide in those instances. Were we to take into account our beyond comments about the statutes we discuss here, we'd additionally ought to account for Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, N. A., 405 U. S., at 401-402, and n. 12, in which the Court handled section 92 as legitimate law, notwithstanding noting its absence from america Code. Neither case tells us some thing helpful for resolving this one, even though together they contain a valuable reminder about the want to differentiate an opinion s retaining from its dicta.

    Oral Argument - April 19, 1993
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