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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
CHUNON L. BAILEY, aka POLO, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
on writ of certiorari to the us courtroom of appeals for the second circuit
[February 19, 2013]
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. A search may be of a person, a component, or an area. So too a seizure can be of a person, a aspect, or even a place. A seek or a seizure may also arise singly or in combination, and in differing series. In some cases the validity of 1 determines the validity of the other. The instantaneous case entails the hunt of an area (an condominium dwelling) and the seizure of a person. But right here, although it's miles stated that the quest became lawful, it does no longer follow that the seizure became lawful as well. The seizure of the individual is pretty in question. The trouble to be resolved is whether or not the seizure of the man or woman was reasonable while he became stopped and detained at a ways far from the premises to be searched when the only justification for the detention changed into to make certain the protection and efficacy of the quest.
At eight:forty five p.m. on July 28, 2005, nearby police received a warrant to go looking a residence for a .380-caliber handgun. The house become a basement rental at 103 Lake Drive, in Wyandanch, New York. A private informant had instructed police he determined the gun when he turned into at the condominium to purchase tablets from “a heavy set black male with brief hair” referred to as “Polo.” App. sixteen–26. As the hunt unit started out preparations for executing the warrant, officials, Detectives Richard Sneider and Richard Gorbecki, have been accomplishing surveillance in an unmarked car outside the house. About nine:56 p.m., Sneider and Gorbecki discovered two guys—later identified as petitioner Chunon Bailey and Bryant Middleton—leave the gated location above the basement condo and enter a automobile parked inside the driveway. Both matched the overall physical description of “Polo” provided via the informant. There turned into no indication that the men had been aware about the officers’ presence or had any know-how of the impending seek. The detectives watched the car leave the driveway. They waited for it to go some hundred yards down the road and observed. The detectives knowledgeable the hunt crew in their cause to comply with and detain the departing occupants. The search group then carried out the search warrant on the rental.
Detectives Sneider and Gorbecki tailed Bailey’s automobile for about a mile—and for about 5 mins—earlier than pulling the car over in a parking zone by means of a hearth station. They ordered Bailey and Middleton out of the car and did a patdown seek of each men. The officers located no guns however located a hoop of keys in Bailey’s pocket. Bailey identified himself and stated he become coming from his home at 103 Lake Drive. His driving force’s license, but, confirmed his address as Bayshore, New York, the town in which the personal informant instructed the police the suspect, “Polo,” used to live. Id., at 89. Bailey’s passenger, Middleton, stated Bailey become giving him a journey home and confirmed they were coming from Bailey’s house at 103 Lake Drive. The officers positioned both guys in handcuffs. When Bailey asked why, Gorbecki stated that they were being detained incident to the execution of a search warrant at 103 Lake Drive. Bailey replied: “I don’t live there. Anything you discover there ain’t mine, and I’m now not cooperating together with your investigation.” Id., at fifty seven, seventy seven.
The detectives called for a patrol automobile to take Bailey and Middleton back to the Lake Drive apartment. Detective Sneider drove the unmarked automobile again, even as Detective Gorbecki used Bailey’s set of keys to pressure Bailey’s automobile again to the hunt scene. By the time the group returned to 103 Lake Drive, the search group had determined a gun and pills in undeniable view in the apartment. Bailey and Middleton had been placed below arrest, and Bailey’s keys had been seized incident to the arrest. Officers later located that one in every of Bailey’s keys opened the door of the basement apartment.
Bailey was charged with 3 federal offenses: possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii); ownership of a firearm with the aid of a felon, in violation of
18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense, in violation of §924(c)(1)(A)(i). At trial Bailey moved to suppress the apartment key and the statements he made whilst stopped via Detectives Sneider and Gorbecki. That evidence, Bailey argued, derived from an unreasonable seizure. After an evidentiary hearing america District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied the movement to suppress. The District Court held that Bailey’s detention was permissible below Michigan v. Summers,
452 U. S. 692 (1981)
, as a detention incident to the execution of a seek warrant. In the alternative, it held that Bailey’s detention was lawful as an investigatory detention supported by way of affordable suspicion beneath Terry v. Ohio,
392 U. S. 1 (1968)
. After an ordeal the jury discovered Bailey responsible on all three counts.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dominated that Bailey’s detention become right and affirmed denial of the suppression movement. It interpreted this Court’s choice in Summers to “authoriz[e] regulation enforcement to detain the occupant of premises concern to a legitimate search warrant when that man or woman is seen leaving those premises and the detention is effected as quickly as reasonably potential.” 652 F. 3d 197, 208 (2011). Having found Bailey’s detention justified under Summers, the Court of Appeals did no longer deal with the District Court’s opportunity keeping that the prevent became approved beneath Terry.
The Federal Courts of Appeals have reached differing conclusions as to whether Michigan v. Summers justifies the detention of occupants past the immediately vicinity of the premises covered with the aid of a seek warrant. This Court granted certiorari to address the question. 566 U. S. ___ (2012).
Fourth Amendment, relevant through the
Fourteenth Amendment to the States, gives: “The proper of the people to be stable of their humans . . . towards unreasonable searches and seizures, shall now not be violated, and no Warrants shall difficulty, but upon in all likelihood purpose . . . specially describing the area to be searched, and the humans or matters to be seized.” This Court has stated “the overall rule that
Fourth Amendment seizures are ‘reasonable’ simplest if based totally on probably cause” to believe that the individual has committed against the law. Dunaway v. New York,
442 U. S. 2 hundred,
. The trendy of likely reason, with “roots which are deep in our records,” Henry v. United States,
361 U. S. 98,
a hundred (1959)
, “represent[s] the accrued understanding of precedent and revel in as to the minimal justification vital to make the sort of intrusion concerned in an arrest ‘affordable’ underneath the
Fourth Amendment.” Dunaway, supra, at 208.
Within the framework of those essential policies there is some range for police to detain in which “the intrusion at the citizen’s privacy ‘became a lot much less severe’ than that concerned in a traditional arrest that ‘the opposing pursuits in crime prevention and detection and in the police officer’s safety’ should support the seizure as reasonable.” Summers, supra, at 697–698 (quoting Dunaway, supra, at 209); see also Terry, supra, at 27 (conserving that a police officer who has affordable suspicion of crook pastime might also behavior a short investigative stop).
In Summers, the Court defined an essential category of cases in which detention is allowed with out probably reason to arrest for a criminal offense. It approved officials executing a seek warrant “to detain the occupants of the premises whilst a proper search is performed.” 452 U. S., at 705. The rule in Summers extends farther than some earlier exceptions because it does no longer require regulation enforcement to have specific suspicion that an individual is involved in crook pastime or poses a particular threat to the officials. Muehler v. Mena,
544 U. S. 93 (2005)
. In Muehler, making use of the rule of thumb in Summers, the Court said: “An officer’s authority to detain incident to a seek is express; it does not rely on the ‘quantum of evidence justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed with the aid of the seizure.’ ” 544 U. S., at ninety eight (quoting Summers, supra, at 705, n. 19). The rule introduced in Summers allows detention incident to the execution of a seek warrant “because the person of the additional intrusion caused by detention is slight and due to the fact the reasons for detention are significant.” Muehler, supra, at ninety eight.
In Summers and later instances the occupants detained had been observed inside or immediately outdoor a residence in the interim the cops accomplished the hunt warrant. In Summers, the defendant became detained on a stroll leading down from the front steps of the house. See Tr. of Oral Arg. in O. T. 1980, No. seventy nine–1794, pp. forty one–42; see additionally Muehler, supra, at ninety six (detention of occupant in adjacent garage); Los Angeles County v. Rettele,
550 U. S. 609,
(in line with curiam) (detention of occupants in bedroom). Here, but, petitioner left the rental earlier than the search started out; and the cops waited to detain him till he became nearly a mile away. The issue is whether the reasoning in Summers can justify detentions past the immediately vicinity of the premises being searched. An exception to the
Fourth Amendment rule prohibiting detention absent likely cause ought to not diverge from its reason and purpose. See Florida v. Royer,
460 U. S. 491,
(plurality opinion) (“The scope of the detention should be carefully tailor-made to its underlying justification”). It is necessary, then, to speak about the motives for the rule of thumb explained in Summers to determine if its motive extends to a detention like the one here.
In Summers, the Court recognized three essential law enforcement interests that, taken collectively, justify the detention of an occupant who's at the premises for the duration of the execution of a search warrant: officer protection, facilitating the of completion of the hunt, and preventing flight. 452 U. S., at 702–703.
The first hobby recognized in Summers was “the interest in minimizing the chance of harm to the officials.” Id., at 702. There the Court held that “the execution of a warrant to look for narcotics is the sort of transaction which can supply rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to hide or smash proof,” and “[t]he risk of damage to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officials routinely workout unquestioned command of the state of affairs.” Id., at 702–703.
When regulation enforcement officers execute a seek warrant, protection considerations require that they stable the premises, which can also encompass detaining current occupants. By taking “unquestioned command of the situation,” identity., at 703, the officials can seek with out worry that occupants, who're at the premises and capable of look at the route of the hunt, turns into disruptive, risky, or in any other case frustrate the search.
After Summers, this Court determined Muehler v. Mena. The reasoning and conclusions in Muehler in making use of the Summers rule move pretty a ways in permitting seizure and detention of persons to house the requirements of a search. There, the person detained and held in handcuffs became no longer suspected of the crook hobby being investigated; however, the Court held, she may be detained nevertheless, to stable the premises while the search become underway. The “protection danger inherent in executing a search warrant for guns was enough to justify using handcuffs, [and] the want to detain more than one occupants made using handcuffs all the more affordable.” 544 U. S., at one hundred. While the Court in Muehler did remand for consideration of whether or not the detention there—supposed to were or three hours—turned into important in mild of all the occasions, the reality that so prolonged a detention certainly might have been accepted illustrates the a ways-achieving authority the police have whilst the detention is made at the scene of the quest. This in turn counsels caution earlier than extending the energy to detain humans stopped or apprehended faraway from the premises where the quest is being conducted.
It is likely, certainly almost inevitable inside the case of a resident, that an occupant will return to the premises sooner or later; and this could occur when the officers are nonetheless undertaking the quest. Officers can and do mitigate that risk, but, by means of taking routine precautions, as an instance with the aid of erecting barricades or posting someone on the fringe or on the door. In the immediate case Bailey had left the premises, seemingly with out know-how of the quest. He posed little risk to the officials on the scene. If Bailey had rushed returned to his apartment, the police should have apprehended and detained him underneath Summers. There is not any hooked up precept, but, that lets in the arrest of every person away from the premises who's in all likelihood to return.
The risk, furthermore, that a person may want to go back domestic at some point of the execution of a search warrant isn't confined to occupants who leave rapidly before the start of a seek. The chance that a resident might go back domestic, either for reasons unrelated to the quest or after being alerted via a person at the scene, exists whether he left 5 mins or 5 hours earlier. Unexpected arrivals by using occupants or different men and women aware of travelling the premises may occur oftentimes. Were police to have the authority to detain those humans faraway from the premises, the authority to detain incident to the execution of a search warrant would attain past the intent of ensuring the integrity of the search by way of detaining people who are in truth on the scene.
The Court of Appeals trusted a further protection consideration. It concluded that restricting the utility of the authority to detain to the immediately vicinity could positioned law enforcement officers in a catch 22 situation. They would need to select among detaining an person right now (and hazard alerting occupants nonetheless inner) or permitting the man or woman to go away (and chance no longer being capable of arrest him later if incriminating evidence had been discovered). 652 F. 3d, at 205–206. Although the hazard of alerting occupants who remain inside can be of actual challenge in some times, as in the case while a no-knock warrant has been issued, this safety purpose rests on the false premise that a detention must take vicinity. If the officers find that it'd be risky to detain a departing individ-ual in the front of a residence, they may be not required to stop him. And, where there are grounds to believe the departing occupant is risky, or worried in criminal activity, police will normally not want Summers to detain him at least for brief thinking, as they are able to depend as a substitute on Terry.
The risk that a departing occupant would possibly note the police surveillance and alert others nevertheless within the residence is likewise an inadequate safety cause to justify ex-panding the existing specific authority to detain so that it extends past the immediately location of the premises to be searched. If extended in this manner the purpose would justify detaining anybody in the neighborhood who ought to alert occupants that the police are outdoor, all with out individualized suspicion of criminal hobby or connection to the house to be searched. This opportunity demonstrates why it's miles essential to confine the Summers rule to individuals who are gift whilst and where the search is being carried out.
The second law enforcement interest trusted in Summers was that “the orderly crowning glory of the quest may be facilitated if the occupants of the premises are present.” 452 U. S., at 703. This hobby in performance derives from wonderful, however related, worries.
If occupants are permitted to wander around the premises, there's the capacity for interference with the execution of the hunt warrant. They can cover or spoil evidence, are trying to find to distract the officials, or without a doubt get within the manner. Those dangers aren't provided by way of an occupant who departs ahead. So, in this example, after Bailey drove faraway from the Lake Drive condo, he became not a threat to the proper execution of the hunt. Had he again, officers could have been unfastened to detain him at that point. A preferred interest in keeping off obstruction of a seek, but, can not justify detention beyond the region of the premises to be searched.
Summers additionally referred to that occupants can help the offi-cers. Under the reasoning in Summers, the occupants’ “self-hobby can also set off them to open locked doorways or locked bins to avoid the use of force that isn't best negative to property but can also delay the of entirety of the venture at hand.” Ibid. This justification must be constrained to those people who are on web page and so in a function, while detained, to right away have a look at the progression of the quest; and it would have no proscribing principle were it to be carried out to persons past the premises of the search. Here, it appears the police officers decided to wait till Bailey had left the place of the hunt before detaining him. In any occasion it later became clear to the officers that Bailey did not want to cooperate. See App. fifty seven, 77 (“I don’t stay there. Anything you locate there ain’t mine, and I’m now not cooperating together with your research”). And, by the time the officials introduced Bailey returned to the apartment, the search team had located contraband. Bailey’s detention consequently served no cause in making sure the green of completion of the search.
The 0.33 law enforcement interest addressed in Summers changed into the “the legitimate regulation enforcement hobby in stopping flight within the occasion that incriminating evidence is observed.” 452 U. S., at 702. The right interpretation of this language, inside the context of Summers and within the broader context of the reasonableness popular that have to govern and tell the detention incident to a seek, is that the police can restrict an occupant from leaving the scene of the hunt. As with the other hobbies identified in Summers, this justification serves to keep the integrity of the search via controlling those folks who are on the scene. If law enforcement officials are worried approximately flight, and ought to preserve near supervision of occupants who aren't confined, they might rush the search, causing pointless harm to property or compromising its careful execution. Allowing officers to steady the scene via detaining the ones present also prevents the search from being impeded by using occupants leaving with the evidence being sought or the way to locate it.
The situation over flight isn't always because of the danger of flight itself but because of the harm that capability flight can reason to the integrity of the search. This hobby does not independently justify detention of an occupant be- yond the on the spot vicinity of the premises to be searched. The need to save you flight, if unbounded, might be used to argue for detention, whilst a search is underway, of any everyday occupant irrespective of his or her vicinity at the time of the quest. If no longer circumscribed, the motive of stopping flight would justify, as an instance, detaining a suspect who is 10 miles away, geared up to board a plane. The interest in preventing get away from police can't expand this a long way with out undermining the standard guidelines for arrest primarily based on probably purpose or a quick forestall for questioning underneath requirements derived from Terry. Even if the detention of a former occupant faraway from the premises should facilitate a later arrest ought to incriminating evidence be determined, “the mere reality that law enforcement may be made greater green can never through itself justify disregard of the
Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U. S. 385,
In sum, of the three regulation enforcement hobbies diagnosed to justify the detention in Summers, none applies with the equal or similar pressure to the detention of new occupants beyond the immediately vicinity of the premises to be searched. Any of the character interests is also insufficient, on its very own, to justify an expansion of the rule of thumb in Summers to permit the detention of a former occupant, anyplace he can be found away from the scene of the hunt. This could supply officials too much discretion. The specific authority to detain incident to the execution of a search warrant should be limited to the immediately vicinity of the premises to be searched.
In Summers, the Court diagnosed the authority to detain occupants incident to the execution of a seek warrant no longer handiest in light of the regulation enforcement hobbies at stake however additionally because the intrusion on private liberty become restrained. The Court held detention of a current occupant “represents simplest an incremental intrusion on personal liberty while the hunt of a domestic has been legal by way of a valid warrant.” 452 U. S., at 703. Because the detention takes place within the individual’s personal home, “it could upload best minimally to the general public stigma associated with the search itself and could contain neither the inconvenience nor the indignity associated with a compelled visit to the police station.” Id., at 702.
Where officials arrest an character away from his home, however, there is an additional level of intrusiveness. A public detention, even if simply incident to a search, will resemble a complete-fledged arrest. As demonstrated right here, detention past the instantaneous location can contain an initial detention far from the scene and a second detention at the house. In between, the character will go through the extra indignity of a compelled transfer returned to the premises, giving all the appearances of an arrest. The detention right here became greater intrusive than a normal detention at the seek scene. Bailey’s vehicle become stopped; he changed into ordered to step out and turned into detained in complete public view; he turned into handcuffed, transported in a marked patrol vehicle, and detained further outdoor the apartment. These records illustrate that detention away from a premises where police are already present often could be more intrusive than detentions on the scene.
Summers diagnosed that a rule allowing the detention of occupants at the premises at some point of the execution of a search warrant, even absent individualized suspicion, become reasonable and important in light of the law enforcement pursuits in conducting a secure and green seek. Because this exception presents tremendous authority to police officers to detain outdoor of the conventional regulations of the
Fourth Amendment, it should be circumscribed.
A spatial constraint described with the aid of the instant place of the premises to be searched is therefore required for detentions incident to the execution of a seek warrant. The police action authorized here—the hunt of a residence—has a spatial size, and so a spatial or geographical boundary can be used to decide the place inside which each the hunt and detention incident to that search may additionally arise. Limiting the rule of thumb in Summers to the vicinity in which an occupant poses a real risk to the safe and green execution of a seek warrant ensures that the scope of the detention incident to a search is restricted to its underlying justification. Once an occupant is past the immediately place of the premises to be searched, the hunt-related regulation enforcement pastimes are faded and the intrusiveness of the detention is greater extreme.
Here, petitioner changed into detained at a factor past any affordable understanding of the instant location of the premises in query; and so this case offers neither the necessity nor the occasion to in addition outline the meaning of immediately place. In nearer instances courts can don't forget various of factors to determine whether or not an occupant became detained inside the instant region of the premises to be searched, which include the lawful limits of the premises, whether the occupant became inside the line of sight of his dwelling, the ease of reentry from the occupant’s location, and different relevant elements.
Confining an officer’s authority to detain beneath Summers to the instantaneous vicinity of a premises to be searched is a right restrict as it accords with the intent of the rule of thumb. The rule adopted via the Court of Appeals right here, permitting detentions of a departed occupant “as soon as moderately practicable,” departs from the spatial restrict that is necessary to confine the rule of thumb in light of the tremendous intrusions on the freedom of those detained.
Because detention is justified through the interests in executing a safe and green seek, the decision to detain must be acted upon at the scene of the quest and no longer at a later time in a greater far off vicinity. If officials opt for to defer the detention until the suspect or departing occupant leaves the immediate place, the lawfulness of detention is controlled by way of different requirements, consisting of, of route, a quick prevent for questioning based on affordable suspicion underneath Terry or an arrest primarily based on in all likelihood purpose. A suspect’s particular movements in leaving the scene, along with whether he appears to be armed or fleeing with the proof sought, and any records the officers acquire from folks who are engaging in the hunt, which include facts that incriminating evidence has been located, will endure, of direction, at the lawfulness of a later forestall or detention. For instance, had the quest team radioed Detectives Sneider and Gorbecki approximately the gun and drugs found within the Lake Drive condominium because the officers stopped Bailey and Middleton, this will have furnished them with likely cause for an arrest.
Detentions incident to the execution of a seek warrant are reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment because the restrained intrusion on personal liberty is outweighed with the aid of the special law enforcement pursuits at stake. Once an individual has left the instantaneous location of a premises to be searched, however, detentions should be justified by way of a few different rationale. In this recognize it must be stated that the District Court, as an alternative ruling, held that stopping petitioner changed into lawful under Terry. This opinion expresses no view on that trouble. It can be open, on remand, for the Court of Appeals to deal with the matter and to decide whether, assuming the Terry forestall became valid, it yielded data that justified the detention the officials then imposed.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for in addition proceedings steady with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
CHUNON L. BAILEY, aka POLO, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
on writ of certiorari to the us court of appeals for the second one circuit
[February 19, 2013]
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Ginsburg and Justice Kagan be part of, concurring.
I be part of the Court’s opinion. I write one at a time to em-phasize why the Court of Appeals’ interest-balancing technique to this situation—advocated by using the dissent—is incompatible with the specific rule set forth in Michigan v. Summers,
452 U. S. 692 (1981)
Summers recognized numerous regulation-enforcement interests assisting the detention of occupants incident to the execution of a warrant to look for contraband, at the side of numerous motives why such detentions are generally much less intrusive than an arrest. See identity., at 701–704. Weighing those factors, the Court determined that “it's far constitutionally affordable to require [a] citizen to remain at the same time as officials of the regulation execute a valid warrant to search his home.” Id., at 705.
The existence and scope of the Summers exception had been predicated on that balancing of the pastimes and burdens. But—crucially—whether Summers authorizes a seizure in an character case does no longer rely upon any balancing, because the Summers exception, within its scope, is “express.” Muehler v. Mena,
544 U. S. ninety three,
. That Summers establishes a specific, bright-line rule is clearly now not open to discuss—Summers itself insisted on it: “The rule we adopt today does no longer depend on such an ad hoc willpower, because the officer isn't required to evaluate both the quantum of evidence justifying detention or the volume of the intrusion to be imposed by way of the seizure.” 452 U. S., at 705, n. 19. Where Summers applies, a seizure is ipso facto “constitutionally affordable.” Id., at 705.
The question in this example is whether Summers applies in any respect. It applies best to seizures of “occupants”—this is, folks inside “the immediate area of the premises to be searched.” Ante, at 11. Bailey was seized a mile away. Ergo, Summers can not sanction Bailey’s detention. It actually is that simple.
The Court of Appeals’ mistake, echoed through the dissent, became to update that trustworthy, binary inquiry with open-ended balancing. Weighing the equities—Bailey “posed a threat of damage to the officers,” his detention “changed into no longer unreasonably extended,” and so forth—the Court of Appeals proclaimed the officers’ conduct, “in the instances supplied, reasonable and prudent.” 652 F. 3d 197, 206 (CA2 2011) (inner quotation marks and brackets unnoticed); see additionally post, at three–four (opinion of Breyer, J.). That can be so, however it's far beside the point to whether or not Summers legal the officials to capture Bailey with out probable purpose. To resolve that issue, a courtroom want ask only one question: Was the man or woman seized inside “the on the spot vicinity of the premises to be searched”? Ante, at 11.
The Court of Appeals read Summers’ spatial constraint really extra promiscuously: In its view, it sufficed that police observed Bailey “inside the method of leaving the premises” and detained him “as quickly as practicable.” 652 F. 3d, at 206 (emphasis deleted); see also publish, at 6–7. That has pragmatic attraction; police, the argument runs, need to no longer be precluded from seizing the departing occupant at a distance from the premises if that might be safer than stopping him at the front steps. But it rests on the fallacy that each search warrant entitles the Government to a concomitant Summers detention. Conducting a Summers seizure incident to the execution of a warrant “isn't the Government’s right; it's far an exception—justified by means of necessity—to a rule that could in any other case render the [seizure] unlawful.” Thornton v. United States,
541 U. S. 615,
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
It bears repeating that the “widespread rule” is “that
Fourth Amendment seizures are ‘reasonable’ handiest if based on probably purpose.” Dunaway v. New York,
442 U. S. 2 hundred,
. Summers embodies a specific judgment that during one slim condition—the presence of occupants at some point of the execution of a seek warrant—seizures are affordable in spite of the absence of likely purpose. Sum- mers itself foresaw that without clear limits its excep- tion should swallow the overall rule: If a “multifactor balancing take a look at of ‘affordable police behavior below the cir-cumstances’ ” were prolonged “to cowl all seizures that do not quantity to technical arrests,” it identified, the “ ‘protections supposed through the Framers could all too without difficulty dis-seem within the consideration and balancing of the multi-farious instances offered by using one of a kind instances.’ ” 452 U. S., at 705, n. 19 (quoting Dunaway, supra, at 213 (a few inner quotation marks left out)). The dissent might harvest from Summers what it likes (permission to capture with out possibly cause) and leave in the back of what it unearths uncongenial (hassle of that permission to a narrow, specific exception, now not an open-ended “reasonableness” inquiry).* Summers anticipated that gambit and explicitly disavowed the dissent’s balancing test. See 452 U. S., at 705, n. 19 (“[T]he rule we adopt these days does no longer depend on such an advert hoc determination”).
Regrettably, this Court’s opinion in Summers facilitated the Court of Appeals’ mistakes right here via putting forth a smorgasbord of law-enforcement interests assertedly justifying its preserving, inclusive of “stopping flight within the occasion that incriminating evidence is observed” and acquiring citizens’ assistance in “open[ing] locked doorways or locked bins.” Id., at 701–703. We ought to no longer have been so expansive. The Summers exception is as it should be predicated most effective on regulation enforcement’s hobby in wearing out the search unimpeded via violence or other disruptions. “The common denominator” of the few
Fourth Amendment doctrines allowing seizures based on less than in all likelihood reason “is the presence of some governmental hobby unbiased of the ordinary interest in investigating crime and apprehending suspects.” Id., at 707 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Preventing flight is not a special governmental hobby—it's far indistinguishable from the normal interest in apprehending suspects. Similarly, the hobby in inducing residents to open locked doors or packing containers is not anything more than the regular interest in investigating crime. That Summers detentions useful resource police in uncovering evidence and nabbing criminals does not distinguish them from the mine run of seizures unsupported by way of possibly motive, which the
Fourth Amendment normally proscribes.
* * *
Summers’ clear rule simplifies the assignment of officials who encounter occupants for the duration of a seek. “[I]f police are to have plausible rules, the balancing of the competing in-terests . . . ‘ought to in massive element be completed on a specific basis—not in an advert hoc, case-via-case style via person police officers.’ ” Id., at 705, n. 19 (quoting Dunaway, supra, at 219–220 (White, J., concurring)); see additionally Ari- zona v. Gant,
556 U. S. 332
–353 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). But having obtained the benefit of Summers’ specific authorization to detain occupants incident to a seek, the Government need to take the bitter with the sweet: Beyond Summers’ spatial bounds, sei-zures must comport with regular
Fourth Amendment principles.