, Bailey v. United States :: 568 U.S. 186 (2013) :: US LAW US Supreme Court Center

Bailey v. United States :: 568 U.S. 186 (2013) :: US LAW US Supreme Court Center

    USLaw.Site Opinion Summary and Annotations

    While police had been getting ready to execute a seek warrant for a basement condominium, detectives in an unmarked car out of doors the apartment saw guys, later recognized as Bailey and Middleton, go away the gated vicinity above the condominium, get in a automobile, and power away. The detectives followed for about a mile, then stopped the automobile. They discovered keys for the duration of a pat-down seek of Bailey, who stated that he resided in the condominium. He later denied it whilst knowledgeable of the quest. The men have been handcuffed and driven to the apartment, where the quest group had determined a gun and illicit tablets. One of Bailey’s keys unlocked the rental’s door. The district court docket denied Bailey’s movement to suppress the key and assertion, keeping that Bailey’s detention was justified below Michigan v. Summers, as a detention incident to execution of a search warrant, and, in the opportunity, that the detention turned into supported via reasonable suspicion underneath Terry v. Ohio. Bailey turned into convicted. The Second Circuit affirmed, without ruling at the Terry declare. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for willpower of whether Terry applies. The rule in Summers, permitting detention although there may be no particular suspicion that an character is worried in crook activity or poses a selected threat to officers, is restrained to the immediately area of the premises to be searched. None of the law enforcement hobbies recognized in Summers applies with comparable pressure to the detention of new occupants past the immediate region of the premises to be searched.

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    NOTE: Where it's far possible, a syllabus (headnote) can be released, as is being achieved in reference to this example, on the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court however has been prepared by using the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 2 hundred U. S. 321 .

    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

    Syllabus

    BAILEY v. UNITED STATES

    certiorari to the usa courtroom of appeals for the second one circuit

    No. eleven–770. Argued November 1, 2012—Decided February 19, 2013

    While police have been getting ready to execute a warrant to search a basement condo for a handgun, detectives conducting surveillance in an unmarked vehicle outside the condo noticed two men―later recognized as petitioner Chunon Bailey and Bryant Middleton―go away the gated region above the apartment, get in a vehicle, and force away. The detectives waited for the men to depart and then accompanied the auto approximately a mile before stopping it. They discovered keys all through a patdown search of Bailey, who initially said that he resided in the condo but later denied it while knowledgeable of the hunt. Both men have been handcuffed and driven in a patrol vehicle to the apartment, where the search team had already found a gun and illicit drugs. After arresting the men, police observed that certainly one of Bailey’s keys unlocked the apartment’s door.

              At trial, the District Court denied Bailey’s motion to suppress the condo key and the statements he made to the detectives whilst stopped, protecting that Bailey’s detention was justified underneath Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 , as a detention incident to the execution of a seek warrant, and, within the alternative, that the detention become supported by using affordable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 . Bailey became convicted. The Second Circuit affirmed denial of the suppression motion. Finding that Summers legal Bailey’s detention, it did not deal with the opportunity Terry keeping.

    Held: The rule in Summers is limited to the instantaneous area of the premises to be searched and does not observe here, wherein Bailey became detained at a factor past any reasonable information of the instantaneous vicinity of the premises in query. Pp. 4−15.

         (a) The Summers rule lets in officials executing a search warrant “to detain the occupants of the premises whilst a proper search is carried out,” 452 U. S., at 705, even if there's no particular suspicion that an man or woman is involved in crook interest or poses a selected danger to the officials, Muehler v. Mena, 544 U. S. ninety three . Detention is authorized “because the man or woman of the extra intrusion resulting from detention is slight and because the justifications for detention are extensive.” Id., at ninety eight. In Summers and later instances the detained occupants have been located within or right away outside the house being searched. Here, however, petitioner left the condo earlier than the search commenced and became detained nearly a mile away. Pp. four−6.

         (b) In Summers, the Court recognized 3 crucial law enforcement pastimes that, taken together, justify detaining an occupant who is at the premises at some stage in the hunt warrant’s execution, 452 U. S., at 702−703. The first, officer safety, requires officials to stable the premises, which might also consist of detaining current occupants so the officials can search without worry that the occupants will become disruptive, risky, or in any other case frustrate the search. If an occupant returns home at some point of the hunt, officers can mitigate the risk through taking routine precautions. Here, however, Bailey posed little threat to the officials on the scene after he left the premises, seemingly with out expertise of the search. Had he lower back, he could have been apprehended and detained below Summers. Were police to have the authority to detain people away from the premises, the authority to detain incident to the execution of a seek warrant could attain beyond the rationale of ensuring the integrity of the hunt by using detaining people who are at the scene. As for the Second Circuit’s extra worries, if officials agree with that it would be dangerous to detain a departing individual in front of a house, they are no longer required to forestall him; and if officers have reasonable suspicion of crook interest, they could instead rely on Terry. The risk that a departing occupant would possibly alert those nonetheless in the residence is also an inadequate safety motive for expanding the detention authority beyond the instant place of the premises to be searched.

         The 2d law enforcement interest is the facilitation of the of entirety of the quest. Unrestrained occupants can hide or break proof, are seeking to distract the officials, or really get inside the manner. But a widespread interest in fending off obstruction of a seek can't justify detention past the region of the premises. Occupants who are stored from leaving may additionally help the officers by means of starting locked doorways or bins to be able to avoid the usage of pressure which can damage belongings or postpone of completion of the hunt. But this justification have to be restricted to persons on site as the search warrant is completed and so in a role to look at the development of the quest.

         The third interest is the hobby in stopping flight, which also serves to preserve the integrity of the search. If officers are worried about flight within the occasion incriminating proof is found, they may rush the hunt, inflicting pointless harm or compromising its cautious execution. The want to save you flight, however, if unbounded, might be used to argue for detention of any normal occupant no matter his or her location on the time of the hunt, e.g., detaining a suspect 10 miles away, prepared to board a plane. Even if the detention of a former occupant far from the premises may want to facilitate a later arrest if incriminating proof is found, “the mere truth that regulation enforcement may be made more efficient can never by using itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 .

         In sum, none of the 3 regulation enforcement pastimes identified in Summers applies with the equal or comparable force to the detention of recent occupants past the on the spot vicinity of the premises to be searched. And each is also insufficient, on its own, to justify an growth of the rule in Summers to permit the detention of a former occupant, anyplace he may be found far from the scene of the hunt. Pp. 6–12.

         (c) As identified in Summers, the detention of a current occupant “represents best an incremental intrusion on non-public liberty whilst the quest of a home has been authorized through a legitimate warrant,” 452 U. S., at 703, however an arrest of an man or woman far from his home entails an extra degree of intrusiveness. A public detention, despite the fact that simply incident to a search, will resemble a full-fledged arrest and may involve the indignity of a forced transfer lower back to the premises. P. 12.

         (d) Limiting the rule of thumb in Summers to the area within which an occupant poses a actual risk to the secure and green execution of a seek warrant ensures that the scope of the detention incident to a search is limited to its underlying justification. Because petitioner turned into detained at a factor beyond any reasonable know-how of immediately region, there is no want to further outline that time period right here. Since detention is justified with the aid of the interests in executing a secure and efficient search, the selection to detain have to be acted upon at the scene of the hunt and not at a later time in a more far off region. Pp. 13−15.

         (e) The question whether or not preventing petitioner became lawful underneath Terry remains open on remand. P. 15.

    652 F. 3d 197, reversed and remanded.

         Kennedy, J., added the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Sca- lia, J., filed a concurring opinion, wherein Ginsburg and Kagan, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined.

    NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before e-book in the preliminary print of the US Reports. Readers are asked to inform the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the USA, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or different formal errors, simply so corrections can be made earlier than the preliminary print is going to press.

    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

    _________________

    No. 11–770

    _________________

    CHUNON L. BAILEY, aka POLO, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

    on writ of certiorari to the us courtroom of appeals for the second circuit

    [February 19, 2013]

         Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.

         The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. A search may be of a person, a component, or an area. So too a seizure can be of a person, a aspect, or even a place. A seek or a seizure may also arise singly or in combination, and in differing series. In some cases the validity of 1 determines the validity of the other. The instantaneous case entails the hunt of an area (an condominium dwelling) and the seizure of a person. But right here, although it's miles stated that the quest became lawful, it does no longer follow that the seizure became lawful as well. The seizure of the individual is pretty in question. The trouble to be resolved is whether or not the seizure of the man or woman was reasonable while he became stopped and detained at a ways far from the premises to be searched when the only justification for the detention changed into to make certain the protection and efficacy of the quest.

    I

    A

         At eight:forty five p.m. on July 28, 2005, nearby police received a warrant to go looking a residence for a .380-caliber handgun. The house become a basement rental at 103 Lake Drive, in Wyandanch, New York. A private informant had instructed police he determined the gun when he turned into at the condominium to purchase tablets from “a heavy set black male with brief hair” referred to as “Polo.” App. sixteen–26. As the hunt unit started out preparations for executing the warrant, officials, Detectives Richard Sneider and Richard Gorbecki, have been accomplishing surveillance in an unmarked car outside the house. About nine:56 p.m., Sneider and Gorbecki discovered two guys—later identified as petitioner Chunon Bailey and Bryant Middleton—leave the gated location above the basement condo and enter a automobile parked inside the driveway. Both matched the overall physical description of “Polo” provided via the informant. There turned into no indication that the men had been aware about the officers’ presence or had any know-how of the impending seek. The detectives watched the car leave the driveway. They waited for it to go some hundred yards down the road and observed. The detectives knowledgeable the hunt crew in their cause to comply with and detain the departing occupants. The search group then carried out the search warrant on the rental.

         Detectives Sneider and Gorbecki tailed Bailey’s automobile for about a mile—and for about 5 mins—earlier than pulling the car over in a parking zone by means of a hearth station. They ordered Bailey and Middleton out of the car and did a patdown seek of each men. The officers located no guns however located a hoop of keys in Bailey’s pocket. Bailey identified himself and stated he become coming from his home at 103 Lake Drive. His driving force’s license, but, confirmed his address as Bayshore, New York, the town in which the personal informant instructed the police the suspect, “Polo,” used to live. Id., at 89. Bailey’s passenger, Middleton, stated Bailey become giving him a journey home and confirmed they were coming from Bailey’s house at 103 Lake Drive. The officers positioned both guys in handcuffs. When Bailey asked why, Gorbecki stated that they were being detained incident to the execution of a search warrant at 103 Lake Drive. Bailey replied: “I don’t live there. Anything you discover there ain’t mine, and I’m now not cooperating together with your investigation.” Id., at fifty seven, seventy seven.

         The detectives called for a patrol automobile to take Bailey and Middleton back to the Lake Drive apartment. Detective Sneider drove the unmarked automobile again, even as Detective Gorbecki used Bailey’s set of keys to pressure Bailey’s automobile again to the hunt scene. By the time the group returned to 103 Lake Drive, the search group had determined a gun and pills in undeniable view in the apartment. Bailey and Middleton had been placed below arrest, and Bailey’s keys had been seized incident to the arrest. Officers later located that one in every of Bailey’s keys opened the door of the basement apartment.

    B

         Bailey was charged with 3 federal offenses: possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii); ownership of a firearm with the aid of a felon, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense, in violation of §924(c)(1)(A)(i). At trial Bailey moved to suppress the apartment key and the statements he made whilst stopped via Detectives Sneider and Gorbecki. That evidence, Bailey argued, derived from an unreasonable seizure. After an evidentiary hearing america District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied the movement to suppress. The District Court held that Bailey’s detention was permissible below Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981) , as a detention incident to the execution of a seek warrant. In the alternative, it held that Bailey’s detention was lawful as an investigatory detention supported by way of affordable suspicion beneath Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968) . After an ordeal the jury discovered Bailey responsible on all three counts.

         The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dominated that Bailey’s detention become right and affirmed denial of the suppression movement. It interpreted this Court’s choice in Summers to “authoriz[e] regulation enforcement to detain the occupant of premises concern to a legitimate search warrant when that man or woman is seen leaving those premises and the detention is effected as quickly as reasonably potential.” 652 F. 3d 197, 208 (2011). Having found Bailey’s detention justified under Summers, the Court of Appeals did no longer deal with the District Court’s opportunity keeping that the prevent became approved beneath Terry.

         The Federal Courts of Appeals have reached differing conclusions as to whether Michigan v. Summers justifies the detention of occupants past the immediately vicinity of the premises covered with the aid of a seek warrant. This Court granted certiorari to address the question. 566 U. S. ___ (2012).

    II

         The Fourth Amendment, relevant through the Fourteenth Amendment to the States, gives: “The proper of the people to be stable of their humans . . . towards unreasonable searches and seizures, shall now not be violated, and no Warrants shall difficulty, but upon in all likelihood purpose . . . specially describing the area to be searched, and the humans or matters to be seized.” This Court has stated “the overall rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are ‘reasonable’ simplest if based totally on probably cause” to believe that the individual has committed against the law. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 2 hundred, 213 (1979) . The trendy of likely reason, with “roots which are deep in our records,” Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, a hundred (1959) , “represent[s] the accrued understanding of precedent and revel in as to the minimal justification vital to make the sort of intrusion concerned in an arrest ‘affordable’ underneath the Fourth Amendment.” Dunaway, supra, at 208.

         Within the framework of those essential policies there is some range for police to detain in which “the intrusion at the citizen’s privacy ‘became a lot much less severe’ than that concerned in a traditional arrest that ‘the opposing pursuits in crime prevention and detection and in the police officer’s safety’ should support the seizure as reasonable.” Summers, supra, at 697–698 (quoting Dunaway, supra, at 209); see also Terry, supra, at 27 (conserving that a police officer who has affordable suspicion of crook pastime might also behavior a short investigative stop).

         In Summers, the Court defined an essential category of cases in which detention is allowed with out probably reason to arrest for a criminal offense. It approved officials executing a seek warrant “to detain the occupants of the premises whilst a proper search is performed.” 452 U. S., at 705. The rule in Summers extends farther than some earlier exceptions because it does no longer require regulation enforcement to have specific suspicion that an individual is involved in crook pastime or poses a particular threat to the officials. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U. S. 93 (2005) . In Muehler, making use of the rule of thumb in Summers, the Court said: “An officer’s authority to detain incident to a seek is express; it does not rely on the ‘quantum of evidence justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed with the aid of the seizure.’ ” 544 U. S., at ninety eight (quoting Summers, supra, at 705, n. 19). The rule introduced in Summers allows detention incident to the execution of a seek warrant “because the person of the additional intrusion caused by detention is slight and due to the fact the reasons for detention are significant.” Muehler, supra, at ninety eight.

         In Summers and later instances the occupants detained had been observed inside or immediately outdoor a residence in the interim the cops accomplished the hunt warrant. In Summers, the defendant became detained on a stroll leading down from the front steps of the house. See Tr. of Oral Arg. in O. T. 1980, No. seventy nine–1794, pp. forty one–42; see additionally Muehler, supra, at ninety six (detention of occupant in adjacent garage); Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 550 U. S. 609, 611 (2007) (in line with curiam) (detention of occupants in bedroom). Here, but, petitioner left the rental earlier than the search started out; and the cops waited to detain him till he became nearly a mile away. The issue is whether the reasoning in Summers can justify detentions past the immediately vicinity of the premises being searched. An exception to the Fourth Amendment rule prohibiting detention absent likely cause ought to not diverge from its reason and purpose. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“The scope of the detention should be carefully tailor-made to its underlying justification”). It is necessary, then, to speak about the motives for the rule of thumb explained in Summers to determine if its motive extends to a detention like the one here.

    A

         In Summers, the Court recognized three essential law enforcement interests that, taken collectively, justify the detention of an occupant who's at the premises for the duration of the execution of a search warrant: officer protection, facilitating the of completion of the hunt, and preventing flight. 452 U. S., at 702–703.

    1

         The first hobby recognized in Summers was “the interest in minimizing the chance of harm to the officials.” Id., at 702. There the Court held that “the execution of a warrant to look for narcotics is the sort of transaction which can supply rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to hide or smash proof,” and “[t]he risk of damage to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officials routinely workout unquestioned command of the state of affairs.” Id., at 702–703.

         When regulation enforcement officers execute a seek warrant, protection considerations require that they stable the premises, which can also encompass detaining current occupants. By taking “unquestioned command of the situation,” identity., at 703, the officials can seek with out worry that occupants, who're at the premises and capable of look at the route of the hunt, turns into disruptive, risky, or in any other case frustrate the search.

         After Summers, this Court determined Muehler v. Mena. The reasoning and conclusions in Muehler in making use of the Summers rule move pretty a ways in permitting seizure and detention of persons to house the requirements of a search. There, the person detained and held in handcuffs became no longer suspected of the crook hobby being investigated; however, the Court held, she may be detained nevertheless, to stable the premises while the search become underway. The “protection danger inherent in executing a search warrant for guns was enough to justify using handcuffs, [and] the want to detain more than one occupants made using handcuffs all the more affordable.” 544 U. S., at one hundred. While the Court in Muehler did remand for consideration of whether or not the detention there—supposed to were or three hours—turned into important in mild of all the occasions, the reality that so prolonged a detention certainly might have been accepted illustrates the a ways-achieving authority the police have whilst the detention is made at the scene of the quest. This in turn counsels caution earlier than extending the energy to detain humans stopped or apprehended faraway from the premises where the quest is being conducted.

         It is likely, certainly almost inevitable inside the case of a resident, that an occupant will return to the premises sooner or later; and this could occur when the officers are nonetheless undertaking the quest. Officers can and do mitigate that risk, but, by means of taking routine precautions, as an instance with the aid of erecting barricades or posting someone on the fringe or on the door. In the immediate case Bailey had left the premises, seemingly with out know-how of the quest. He posed little risk to the officials on the scene. If Bailey had rushed returned to his apartment, the police should have apprehended and detained him underneath Summers. There is not any hooked up precept, but, that lets in the arrest of every person away from the premises who's in all likelihood to return.

         The risk, furthermore, that a person may want to go back domestic at some point of the execution of a search warrant isn't confined to occupants who leave rapidly before the start of a seek. The chance that a resident might go back domestic, either for reasons unrelated to the quest or after being alerted via a person at the scene, exists whether he left 5 mins or 5 hours earlier. Unexpected arrivals by using occupants or different men and women aware of travelling the premises may occur oftentimes. Were police to have the authority to detain those humans faraway from the premises, the authority to detain incident to the execution of a search warrant would attain past the intent of ensuring the integrity of the search by way of detaining people who are in truth on the scene.

         The Court of Appeals trusted a further protection consideration. It concluded that restricting the utility of the authority to detain to the immediately vicinity could positioned law enforcement officers in a catch 22 situation. They would need to select among detaining an person right now (and hazard alerting occupants nonetheless inner) or permitting the man or woman to go away (and chance no longer being capable of arrest him later if incriminating evidence had been discovered). 652 F. 3d, at 205–206. Although the hazard of alerting occupants who remain inside can be of actual challenge in some times, as in the case while a no-knock warrant has been issued, this safety purpose rests on the false premise that a detention must take vicinity. If the officers find that it'd be risky to detain a departing individ-ual in the front of a residence, they may be not required to stop him. And, where there are grounds to believe the departing occupant is risky, or worried in criminal activity, police will normally not want Summers to detain him at least for brief thinking, as they are able to depend as a substitute on Terry.

         The risk that a departing occupant would possibly note the police surveillance and alert others nevertheless within the residence is likewise an inadequate safety cause to justify ex-panding the existing specific authority to detain so that it extends past the immediately location of the premises to be searched. If extended in this manner the purpose would justify detaining anybody in the neighborhood who ought to alert occupants that the police are outdoor, all with out individualized suspicion of criminal hobby or connection to the house to be searched. This opportunity demonstrates why it's miles essential to confine the Summers rule to individuals who are gift whilst and where the search is being carried out.

    2

         The second law enforcement interest trusted in Summers was that “the orderly crowning glory of the quest may be facilitated if the occupants of the premises are present.” 452 U. S., at 703. This hobby in performance derives from wonderful, however related, worries.

         If occupants are permitted to wander around the premises, there's the capacity for interference with the execution of the hunt warrant. They can cover or spoil evidence, are trying to find to distract the officials, or without a doubt get within the manner. Those dangers aren't provided by way of an occupant who departs ahead. So, in this example, after Bailey drove faraway from the Lake Drive condo, he became not a threat to the proper execution of the hunt. Had he again, officers could have been unfastened to detain him at that point. A preferred interest in keeping off obstruction of a seek, but, can not justify detention beyond the region of the premises to be searched.

         Summers additionally referred to that occupants can help the offi-cers. Under the reasoning in Summers, the occupants’ “self-hobby can also set off them to open locked doorways or locked bins to avoid the use of force that isn't best negative to property but can also delay the of entirety of the venture at hand.” Ibid. This justification must be constrained to those people who are on web page and so in a function, while detained, to right away have a look at the progression of the quest; and it would have no proscribing principle were it to be carried out to persons past the premises of the search. Here, it appears the police officers decided to wait till Bailey had left the place of the hunt before detaining him. In any occasion it later became clear to the officers that Bailey did not want to cooperate. See App. fifty seven, 77 (“I don’t stay there. Anything you locate there ain’t mine, and I’m now not cooperating together with your research”). And, by the time the officials introduced Bailey returned to the apartment, the search team had located contraband. Bailey’s detention consequently served no cause in making sure the green of completion of the search.

    3

         The 0.33 law enforcement interest addressed in Summers changed into the “the legitimate regulation enforcement hobby in stopping flight within the occasion that incriminating evidence is observed.” 452 U. S., at 702. The right interpretation of this language, inside the context of Summers and within the broader context of the reasonableness popular that have to govern and tell the detention incident to a seek, is that the police can restrict an occupant from leaving the scene of the hunt. As with the other hobbies identified in Summers, this justification serves to keep the integrity of the search via controlling those folks who are on the scene. If law enforcement officials are worried approximately flight, and ought to preserve near supervision of occupants who aren't confined, they might rush the search, causing pointless harm to property or compromising its careful execution. Allowing officers to steady the scene via detaining the ones present also prevents the search from being impeded by using occupants leaving with the evidence being sought or the way to locate it.

         The situation over flight isn't always because of the danger of flight itself but because of the harm that capability flight can reason to the integrity of the search. This hobby does not independently justify detention of an occupant be- yond the on the spot vicinity of the premises to be searched. The need to save you flight, if unbounded, might be used to argue for detention, whilst a search is underway, of any everyday occupant irrespective of his or her vicinity at the time of the quest. If no longer circumscribed, the motive of stopping flight would justify, as an instance, detaining a suspect who is 10 miles away, geared up to board a plane. The interest in preventing get away from police can't expand this a long way with out undermining the standard guidelines for arrest primarily based on probably purpose or a quick forestall for questioning underneath requirements derived from Terry. Even if the detention of a former occupant faraway from the premises should facilitate a later arrest ought to incriminating evidence be determined, “the mere reality that law enforcement may be made greater green can never through itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 393 (1978) .

         In sum, of the three regulation enforcement hobbies diagnosed to justify the detention in Summers, none applies with the equal or similar pressure to the detention of new occupants beyond the immediately vicinity of the premises to be searched. Any of the character interests is also insufficient, on its very own, to justify an expansion of the rule of thumb in Summers to permit the detention of a former occupant, anyplace he can be found away from the scene of the hunt. This could supply officials too much discretion. The specific authority to detain incident to the execution of a search warrant should be limited to the immediately vicinity of the premises to be searched.

    B

         In Summers, the Court diagnosed the authority to detain occupants incident to the execution of a seek warrant no longer handiest in light of the regulation enforcement hobbies at stake however additionally because the intrusion on private liberty become restrained. The Court held detention of a current occupant “represents simplest an incremental intrusion on personal liberty while the hunt of a domestic has been legal by way of a valid warrant.” 452 U. S., at 703. Because the detention takes place within the individual’s personal home, “it could upload best minimally to the general public stigma associated with the search itself and could contain neither the inconvenience nor the indignity associated with a compelled visit to the police station.” Id., at 702.

         Where officials arrest an character away from his home, however, there is an additional level of intrusiveness. A public detention, even if simply incident to a search, will resemble a complete-fledged arrest. As demonstrated right here, detention past the instantaneous location can contain an initial detention far from the scene and a second detention at the house. In between, the character will go through the extra indignity of a compelled transfer returned to the premises, giving all the appearances of an arrest. The detention right here became greater intrusive than a normal detention at the seek scene. Bailey’s vehicle become stopped; he changed into ordered to step out and turned into detained in complete public view; he turned into handcuffed, transported in a marked patrol vehicle, and detained further outdoor the apartment. These records illustrate that detention away from a premises where police are already present often could be more intrusive than detentions on the scene.

    C

         Summers diagnosed that a rule allowing the detention of occupants at the premises at some point of the execution of a search warrant, even absent individualized suspicion, become reasonable and important in light of the law enforcement pursuits in conducting a secure and green seek. Because this exception presents tremendous authority to police officers to detain outdoor of the conventional regulations of the Fourth Amendment, it should be circumscribed.

         A spatial constraint described with the aid of the instant place of the premises to be searched is therefore required for detentions incident to the execution of a seek warrant. The police action authorized here—the hunt of a residence—has a spatial size, and so a spatial or geographical boundary can be used to decide the place inside which each the hunt and detention incident to that search may additionally arise. Limiting the rule of thumb in Summers to the vicinity in which an occupant poses a real risk to the safe and green execution of a seek warrant ensures that the scope of the detention incident to a search is restricted to its underlying justification. Once an occupant is past the immediately place of the premises to be searched, the hunt-related regulation enforcement pastimes are faded and the intrusiveness of the detention is greater extreme.

         Here, petitioner changed into detained at a factor past any affordable understanding of the instant location of the premises in query; and so this case offers neither the necessity nor the occasion to in addition outline the meaning of immediately place. In nearer instances courts can don't forget various of factors to determine whether or not an occupant became detained inside the instant region of the premises to be searched, which include the lawful limits of the premises, whether the occupant became inside the line of sight of his dwelling, the ease of reentry from the occupant’s location, and different relevant elements.

         Confining an officer’s authority to detain beneath Summers to the instantaneous vicinity of a premises to be searched is a right restrict as it accords with the intent of the rule of thumb. The rule adopted via the Court of Appeals right here, permitting detentions of a departed occupant “as soon as moderately practicable,” departs from the spatial restrict that is necessary to confine the rule of thumb in light of the tremendous intrusions on the freedom of those detained.      Because detention is justified through the interests in executing a safe and green seek, the decision to detain must be acted upon at the scene of the quest and no longer at a later time in a greater far off vicinity. If officials opt for to defer the detention until the suspect or departing occupant leaves the immediate place, the lawfulness of detention is controlled by way of different requirements, consisting of, of route, a quick prevent for questioning based on affordable suspicion underneath Terry or an arrest primarily based on in all likelihood purpose. A suspect’s particular movements in leaving the scene, along with whether he appears to be armed or fleeing with the proof sought, and any records the officers acquire from folks who are engaging in the hunt, which include facts that incriminating evidence has been located, will endure, of direction, at the lawfulness of a later forestall or detention. For instance, had the quest team radioed Detectives Sneider and Gorbecki approximately the gun and drugs found within the Lake Drive condominium because the officers stopped Bailey and Middleton, this will have furnished them with likely cause for an arrest.

    III

         Detentions incident to the execution of a seek warrant are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the restrained intrusion on personal liberty is outweighed with the aid of the special law enforcement pursuits at stake. Once an individual has left the instantaneous location of a premises to be searched, however, detentions should be justified by way of a few different rationale. In this recognize it must be stated that the District Court, as an alternative ruling, held that stopping petitioner changed into lawful under Terry. This opinion expresses no view on that trouble. It can be open, on remand, for the Court of Appeals to deal with the matter and to decide whether, assuming the Terry forestall became valid, it yielded data that justified the detention the officials then imposed.

         The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for in addition proceedings steady with this opinion.

    It is so ordered.

    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

    _________________

    No. 11–770

    _________________

    CHUNON L. BAILEY, aka POLO, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

    on writ of certiorari to the us court of appeals for the second one circuit

    [February 19, 2013]

         Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Ginsburg and Justice Kagan be part of, concurring.

         I be part of the Court’s opinion. I write one at a time to em-phasize why the Court of Appeals’ interest-balancing technique to this situation—advocated by using the dissent—is incompatible with the specific rule set forth in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981) .

         Summers recognized numerous regulation-enforcement interests assisting the detention of occupants incident to the execution of a warrant to look for contraband, at the side of numerous motives why such detentions are generally much less intrusive than an arrest. See identity., at 701–704. Weighing those factors, the Court determined that “it's far constitutionally affordable to require [a] citizen to remain at the same time as officials of the regulation execute a valid warrant to search his home.” Id., at 705.

         The existence and scope of the Summers exception had been predicated on that balancing of the pastimes and burdens. But—crucially—whether Summers authorizes a seizure in an character case does no longer rely upon any balancing, because the Summers exception, within its scope, is “express.” Muehler v. Mena, 544 U. S. ninety three, 98 (2005) . That Summers establishes a specific, bright-line rule is clearly now not open to discuss—Summers itself insisted on it: “The rule we adopt today does no longer depend on such an ad hoc willpower, because the officer isn't required to evaluate both the quantum of evidence justifying detention or the volume of the intrusion to be imposed by way of the seizure.” 452 U. S., at 705, n. 19. Where Summers applies, a seizure is ipso facto “constitutionally affordable.” Id., at 705.

         The question in this example is whether Summers applies in any respect. It applies best to seizures of “occupants”—this is, folks inside “the immediate area of the premises to be searched.” Ante, at 11. Bailey was seized a mile away. Ergo, Summers can not sanction Bailey’s detention. It actually is that simple.

         The Court of Appeals’ mistake, echoed through the dissent, became to update that trustworthy, binary inquiry with open-ended balancing. Weighing the equities—Bailey “posed a threat of damage to the officers,” his detention “changed into no longer unreasonably extended,” and so forth—the Court of Appeals proclaimed the officers’ conduct, “in the instances supplied, reasonable and prudent.” 652 F. 3d 197, 206 (CA2 2011) (inner quotation marks and brackets unnoticed); see additionally post, at three–four (opinion of Breyer, J.). That can be so, however it's far beside the point to whether or not Summers legal the officials to capture Bailey with out probable purpose. To resolve that issue, a courtroom want ask only one question: Was the man or woman seized inside “the on the spot vicinity of the premises to be searched”? Ante, at 11.

         The Court of Appeals read Summers’ spatial constraint really extra promiscuously: In its view, it sufficed that police observed Bailey “inside the method of leaving the premises” and detained him “as quickly as practicable.” 652 F. 3d, at 206 (emphasis deleted); see also publish, at 6–7. That has pragmatic attraction; police, the argument runs, need to no longer be precluded from seizing the departing occupant at a distance from the premises if that might be safer than stopping him at the front steps. But it rests on the fallacy that each search warrant entitles the Government to a concomitant Summers detention. Conducting a Summers seizure incident to the execution of a warrant “isn't the Government’s right; it's far an exception—justified by means of necessity—to a rule that could in any other case render the [seizure] unlawful.” Thornton v. United States, 541 U. S. 615, 627 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).

         It bears repeating that the “widespread rule” is “that Fourth Amendment seizures are ‘reasonable’ handiest if based on probably purpose.” Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 2 hundred, 213 (1979) . Summers embodies a specific judgment that during one slim condition—the presence of occupants at some point of the execution of a seek warrant—seizures are affordable in spite of the absence of likely purpose. Sum- mers itself foresaw that without clear limits its excep- tion should swallow the overall rule: If a “multifactor balancing take a look at of ‘affordable police behavior below the cir-cumstances’ ” were prolonged “to cowl all seizures that do not quantity to technical arrests,” it identified, the “ ‘protections supposed through the Framers could all too without difficulty dis-seem within the consideration and balancing of the multi-farious instances offered by using one of a kind instances.’ ” 452 U. S., at 705, n. 19 (quoting Dunaway, supra, at 213 (a few inner quotation marks left out)). The dissent might harvest from Summers what it likes (permission to capture with out possibly cause) and leave in the back of what it unearths uncongenial (hassle of that permission to a narrow, specific exception, now not an open-ended “reasonableness” inquiry).* Summers anticipated that gambit and explicitly disavowed the dissent’s balancing test. See 452 U. S., at 705, n. 19 (“[T]he rule we adopt these days does no longer depend on such an advert hoc determination”).

         Regrettably, this Court’s opinion in Summers facilitated the Court of Appeals’ mistakes right here via putting forth a smorgasbord of law-enforcement interests assertedly justifying its preserving, inclusive of “stopping flight within the occasion that incriminating evidence is observed” and acquiring citizens’ assistance in “open[ing] locked doorways or locked bins.” Id., at 701–703. We ought to no longer have been so expansive. The Summers exception is as it should be predicated most effective on regulation enforcement’s hobby in wearing out the search unimpeded via violence or other disruptions. “The common denominator” of the few Fourth Amendment doctrines allowing seizures based on less than in all likelihood reason “is the presence of some governmental hobby unbiased of the ordinary interest in investigating crime and apprehending suspects.” Id., at 707 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Preventing flight is not a special governmental hobby—it's far indistinguishable from the normal interest in apprehending suspects. Similarly, the hobby in inducing residents to open locked doors or packing containers is not anything more than the regular interest in investigating crime. That Summers detentions useful resource police in uncovering evidence and nabbing criminals does not distinguish them from the mine run of seizures unsupported by way of possibly motive, which the Fourth Amendment normally proscribes.

    *  *  *

         Summers’ clear rule simplifies the assignment of officials who encounter occupants for the duration of a seek. “[I]f police are to have plausible rules, the balancing of the competing in-terests . . . ‘ought to in massive element be completed on a specific basis—not in an advert hoc, case-via-case style via person police officers.’ ” Id., at 705, n. 19 (quoting Dunaway, supra, at 219–220 (White, J., concurring)); see additionally Ari- zona v. Gant, 556 U. S. 332 –353 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). But having obtained the benefit of Summers’ specific authorization to detain occupants incident to a seek, the Government need to take the bitter with the sweet: Beyond Summers’ spatial bounds, sei-zures must comport with regular Fourth Amendment principles.

    Notes
    1 * The dissent purports to agree “that the question entails drawing a line of demarcation granting a express form of detention authority.” Post, at three. What the dissent misses is that a “specific” exception have to be defined by way of express limits. Summers’ authorization to detain applies best to “occupants”—a bright-line obstacle that the dissent’s “fairly conceivable” check discards altogether.

    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

    _________________

    No. 11–770

    _________________

    CHUNON L. BAILEY, aka POLO, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

    on writ of certiorari to the united states court docket of appeals for the second one circuit

    [February 19, 2013]

         Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Thomas and Justice Alito join, dissenting.

         Did the police act fairly after they accompanied (for zero.7 miles), and then detained, guys who left a basement condo as the police were about to go into to execute a seek warrant for a gun? The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed that the police motion become affordable due to the fact (1) the “premises [were] problem to a legitimate search warrant,” (2) the detained people were “visible leaving the ones premises,” and (3) “the detention [was] effected as quickly as moderately conceivable.” 652 F. 3d 197, 208 (2011). In light of the risks of flight, of proof destruction, and of human harm found in this and similar cases, I might comply with the method of the Court of Appeals and uphold its determination.

    I

         The Court of Appeals rested its retaining upon nicely-supported District Court findings. The police stopped the men “at the earliest practicable vicinity that became constant with the safety and safety of the officers and the general public.” 468 F. Supp. 2nd 373, 380 (EDNY 2006). “[D]etention in open view out of doors the residence” could have subjected the officials “to additional risks for the duration of the execution of the search,” and it might have “poten-tially frustrat[ed] the complete motive of the search because of destruction of proof.” Id., at 379. It also could have

    “jeopardize[d] the search or endanger[ed] the lives of the officers . . . by permitting some other occupants within the house, who might see or listen the detention of the man or woman outside the residence as he become leaving, to have a while to (1) ruin or hide incriminating evidence just before the police are about to enter for the quest; (2) flee through a back door or window; or (three) arm themselves in training for a violent disagreement with the police when they entered to conduct the quest.” Id., at 380.

    Moreover, the police stopped the men’s automobile “at the first spot where they determined it become secure to conduct the stop,” specifically after the automobile, which had traveled some blocks alongside busier streets and intersections, turned off on a quieter side avenue. Id., at 379.

    II

         The conserving via the Court of Appeals is strongly supported by way of Supreme Court precedent. In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981) , this Court held that “a warrant to look for contraband founded on probably reason implic-itly contains with it the confined authority to detain the occu-pants of the premises whilst a proper search is carried out.” Id., at 705 (footnote ignored). And the similarities among Summers and this situation are multiple. In Summers the police had a legitimate warrant based totally on in all likelihood motive to look a house for tablets. Id., at 693. Here the police had a legitimate warrant based totally on likely motive to look a residence for a gun and ammunition, believed for use in a couple of drug deals. App. sixteen–18, 26. In Summers the police, starting to execute that warrant, were outdoor the house. 452 U. S., at 693. Here the police, starting to execute that warrant, had been out of doors the house. 468 F. Supp. second, at 376. In Summers the police then “encountered” an occupant of the house “descending the the front steps.” 452 U. S., at 693. Here the police then encountered occupants of the house ascending the back (basement) steps. 468 F. Supp. 2nd, at 376; App. forty three, 45. In Summers the police entered the house quickly after encountering that occupant. 452 U. S., at 693. Here the police entered the house quickly after encountering the ones occupants (even as different officers pursued them). App. 49, 59–60. In Summers the police detained the occupant while they engaged in their seek. 452 U. S., at 693. Here the police did the identical. 468 F. Supp. 2nd, at 377.

         Thus, given Summers, most effective one query is open. In Summers the police detained the occupant before he left “the sidewalk outdoor” of the residence. 452 U. S., at 702, n. sixteen. Here the police, for right motive, approved the occupants to leave the premises and stopped them a few blocks from the house. App. 48, seventy two, 86, 103. (See Appendix, infra.) The ensuing question is whether or not this difference makes a constitutional distinction. In particular, that is the right constitutional line to demarcate in which a Summers detention can be initiated? Is it the Court’s line, drawn on the “immediate place” of the residence? Ante, at 12. Or is it the Second Circuit’s line, drawn on the premise of what is “reasonably potential”? 652 F. 3d, at 207. I agree, of course, with the concurrence that the question entails drawing a line of demarcation granting a express form of detention authority. The query is definitely where that line have to be drawn.

    III

         The Court in Summers rested its conclusion upon four issues, every of which strongly supports the reasonableness of Bailey’s detention, and each of that is as in all likelihood or more likely to aid detention of an occupant of searchable premises detained “as soon as moderately practicable,” 652 F. 3d, at 208, as it's miles to aid the detention of an occupant detained “inside the on the spot region” of those premises, ante, at 13. First, the Court in Summers observed “[o]f prime importance . . . the truth that the police had received a warrant to go looking [the occupant’s] house for contraband.” 452 U. S., at 701. That truth meant that the additional detention-associated “invasion of the privateness of the folks who resided there” was “much less intrusive” than in a typical detention. Ibid. The same is authentic here and usually proper on this class of instances.

         Second, the Court in Summers said that the detention changed into justified in part with the aid of “the valid law enforcement interest in stopping flight in the occasion that incriminating proof is observed.” Id., at 702. This component, which Summers identifies as the “[m]ost obvious” cause assisting detention, ibid., can be found in all Summers detentions. Summers applies while police have a seek warrant for contraband, identity., at 701, 705, n. 20, and any occupant departing a residence containing contraband will have incentive to flee as soon as he encounters police. Indeed, considering here the warrant itself defined the possessor of the illegal gun in phrases that implemented to each of the detained occupants, App. 46, the strength of this hobby is equal to or extra than its energy in Summers.

         Third, the Court in Summers stated that the detention become justified in part by way of “the hobby in minimizing the hazard of harm to the officers.” 452 U. S., at 702. The power of this hobby is more right here than in Summers, for here there has been properly motive, backed with the aid of likely motive, to consider that “[a] chrome .380 handgun, ammunition, [and] mag clips” had been on the premises. App. 17. As I discuss beneath, the hobby in minimizing harm to officers is compromised with the aid of encouraging them to provoke searches before they are prepared to accomplish that effectively.

         Fourth, the Court in Summers said that “the orderly completion of the search can be facilitated if the occupants of the premises are gift.” 452 U. S., at 703. The power of this hobby here is equal to its strength in Summers. See, e.g., United States v. Montieth, 662 F. 3d 660, 663 (CA4 2011) (After being followed, detained, and again to his domestic, Montieth helped officers locate “marijuana, firearms, and coins”).

         The Court in Summers did not emphasize any other consideration.

    IV

         There is, however, one further consideration, namely an administrative consideration. A bright line will on occasion help police greater easily administer Fourth Amendment regulations, whilst also assisting to make certain that the police do now not go past the bounds of the affordable. The majority, however, gives no easily administered vivid line. It de-scribes its line as one drawn at “the instantaneous place of the premises to be searched,” to be determined by “a range of of things . . . including [but not limited to] the lawful limits of the premises, whether the occupant changed into in the line of sight of his residing, the ease of reentry from the occupant’s location, and different applicable factors.” Ante, at thirteen. The majority’s line invites case-by means of-case litigation although, divorced as it is from pursuits that immediately motivate the Fourth Amendment, it offers no clear case-by means of-case steerage.

         In any event, as the decrease courts pointed out, concerns associated with the risks of flight, of evidence destruction, and of bodily threat conquer any administrative advantages. Consider why the officers here waited until the occupants had left the block to prevent them: They did so because the occupants could have been armed.

         Indeed, although those rising occupants have been now not armed (or even if the police knew it), those emerging occupants would possibly have visible the officials out of doors the house. And they could have alerted others within the house where, as we now recognize (and the officers had possibly purpose to agree with), there has been a gun lying on the ground in plain view. App. 202. Suppose those inside the house, as soon as alerted, had tried to escape with the proof. Suppose they had destroyed the evidence. Suppose that considered one of them had picked up the gun and fired whilst the officials entered. Suppose that an man or woman in the house (possibly underneath the impact of medication) had grabbed the gun and all started to fire through the window, endangering police, neighbors, or families passing via. See identification., at 26 (informant describing gun’s relation to capsules within the house).

         Considerations of this type reveal the dangers inherent inside the majority’s attempt to attract a semi-vivid line. And they show the want here and on this elegance of instances to check the constitutionality of the details of a search warrant’s execution by using taking more without delay into consideration issues related to protection, evidence, and flight, i.e., the varieties of issues greater immediately related to the Fourth Amendment’s “remaining touchstone of . . . reasonableness.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (internal citation marks overlooked) (slip op., at five). See New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106 –117 (1986) (assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness “[i]n light of the hazard to the officers’ protection”); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, one hundred ten (1977) (in step with curiam) (“We assume it too undeniable for argument that the State’s proffered justification [for a stop]—the safety of the officer—is each valid and weighty”). See also Maryland v. Buie, 494 U. S. 325 , n. 2 (1990) (assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness based totally on “the right stability among officer protection and citizen privacy”).

    V

         The majority responds by means of stating that the police “aren't required to prevent” “a departing man or woman.” Ante, at eight. Quite right. But that reaction isn't convincing. After all, the police do not understand whether or not an rising person has seen an officer. If he has, the risks are as I have described them, e.g., that the ones internal might also analyze of imminent police entry and fireplace the gun. In any event, the police may additionally worry that they is probably or have been spotted. And they will consequently experience the need, underneath the bulk’s rule, to seize the rising person simply before he leaves the “location” but just too quickly to protect against the chance of physical harm inherent in any search for weapons.

         The majority provides that, wherein the departing individ-uals themselves are dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968) , may additionally authorize detention. Terry, but, is irrelevant wherein the risks at difficulty are the ones of flight, destruction of proof, or harm resulting from the ones within the house shooting at police or passersby.

         Finally, the bulk creates hypothetical unique examples of abuse, together with detention “10 miles away” from one’s home at an airport and detention “five hours” after an occupant departs from the premises. Ante, at 11, 8. The seizures the majority imagines, however, strike me as red herrings, for I do not see how they may be justified as having taken vicinity as quickly as “fairly practicable.” Indeed, the majority can discover no such instance in any actual case—despite the fact that nearly each Court of Appeals to have taken into consideration the problem has taken the Second Circuit’s technique. See, e.g., Montieth, 662 F. 3d, at 666–669 (“as quickly as manageable”); United States v. Cavazos, 288 F. 3d 706, 711–712 (CA5 2002) (rejecting “geographic proximity” because the take a look at under Summers); United States v. Cochran, 939 F. 2nd 337, 338–340 (CA6 1991) (“as quickly as doable”); United States v. Bullock, 632 F. 3d 1004, 1018–1021 (CA7 2011) (“as quickly as plausible”); United States v. Castro-Portillo, 211 Fed. Appx. 715, 720–723 (CA10 2007) (“as quickly as workable”); United States v. Sears, 139 Fed. Appx. 162, 166 (CA11 2005) (in line with curiam) (“as soon as possible”).

         While it's far true that a hypothetical occupant whom police do now not come across till he's a ways from the searchable premises could have interaction a number of the Summers rationales, that hypothetical occupant could do so extensively less regularly than would an occupant like Bailey. The distinction is obvious: A hypothetical occupant 10 miles far from the searchable premises is much less probable to examine of the quest (and as a result less likely to alert the ones internal or return to disrupt the hunt) than is an occupant like Bailey, who can also perceive the police presence with out alerting the police to the truth that he observed them.

         It is even less likely—certainly not possible—that the decrease court docket’s rule might (as the majority claims) allow “detaining all of us inside the neighborhood,” ante, at 9, for the guideline explicitly applies handiest to those “within the process of leaving the premises,” 652 F. 3d, at 206.

         More basically, Summers defined that detention incident to a seek is permissible because, once police have received a search warrant, they “have an articulable basis for suspecting crook activity.” 452 U. S., at 699. That articulable, individualized suspicion attaches to the “in particular describ[ed] . . . vicinity to be searched.” U. S. Const., Amdt. four. In turn, the relationship among individualized suspicion of that location and individualized suspicion of “an man or woman inside the technique of leaving the premises” is adequately tight to justify detention. 652 F. 3d, at 206. That connection dissipates when the man or woman isn't always genuinely leaving the premises where, consistent with a neutral magistrate, there may be probably cause to trust contraband may be determined, and the Summers justification therefore does not follow. Hence, Summers applies handiest where the connection between the searchable premises and the detained occupant is as tight as it is in instances like Summers and this one: In each, a departing occupant had just left his home and was merely grew to become around and escorted again there in the course of a search.

    *  *  *

         In sum, I believe that the majority has substituted a line based on indeterminate geography for a line based totally on sensible concerns associated with primary Fourth Amendment concerns including privateness, safety, proof destruction, and flight. In my view, those latter concerns must govern the Fourth Amendment dedication at issue right here. I consequently dissent.

    Appendix

    Shown above, from proper to left, is the path of about zero.7 miles traveled by police as they observed petitioner Bailey and his accomplice.

    Oral Argument - November 01, 2012
    Opinion Announcement - February 19, 2013
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